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Abstract
We study optimal taxation of savings in an economy where agents face self-control prob-
lems, and we allow the severity of self-control to change over the life cycle. We focus on
quasi-hyperbolic discounting with constant elasticity of inter-temporal substitution utility
functions and linear Markov equilibria. We derive explicit formulas for optimal taxes that
implement the efficient (commitment) allocation. We show, analytically, that if agents’ abil-
ity to self-control increases concavely with age, then savings should be subsidised and the
subsidy should decrease with age. We also study the quantitative effects of age-dependent
self-control problems and find that the optimal subsidies in our environment are much larger
than those implied by models with constant self-control. Finally, we compare our optimal
subsidies with those implied by the 401(k) plan. Although the subsidy levels in the two
cases are of comparable magnitudes, the 401(k) plan implies an increasing pattern of subsi-
dies while the optimal subsidies decrease over the life cycle.
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Economists traditionally assume that people discount streams of utility over time expo-
nentially. An important implication of exponential discounting is that under this assumption
people have time-consistent inter-temporal preferences: How an individual feels about a given
inter-temporal tradeoff is independent of when he is asked. However, laboratory and field
studies on inter-temporal choice have cast doubt on this assumption.1 This evidence suggests
that discounting between two future dates gets steeper as we get closer to these dates. Such
time-inconsistent inter-temporal preferences capture self-control problems. Naturally, all this
evidence on self-control problems have led many economists to model this phenomenon and
study its positive and normative implications.2
In this paper, we study optimal capital taxation over the life cycle in the presence of self-
control problems. A commonmodelling assumption in the literature on self-control problems is
that the degree of self-control problem is constant over time. This contrasts with the significant
body of empirical research indicating that, like many other personality traits, people’s ability
to self-control changes as they age. Using an experimental approach to measuring self-control
problems, one of the conclusions Ameriks et al. (2007) reach is summarised in the following
quotation:
“A particularly interesting finding in Table 4 is the profound reduction in the scale of self-control
problems as individuals age, which shows up only when one uses the absolute value of the self-control
measure. Older individuals experience fewer self-control problems, either of overconsumption or under-
consumption, than do their younger counterparts. This finding is certainly consistent with the common
view that temptation falls with age, and has important connections with actual consumption behaviour
over the life cycle. Models that allow for such a time-changing self-control parameter retirement may be
necessary to explain the absence of a spike in consumption spending at the point when retirement assets
become fully liquid.”
Another set of evidence for changing levels of self-control problems comes from literature
that investigates inter-temporal discounting over the life span. This research has shown that
1See DellaVigna (2009) for a survey of field studies and Frederick et al. (2002) for a survey of experimental
studies. Also, see Laibson et al. (2007) for evidence of self-control problems in consumption asset holdings panel
data.
2Three main models that have been proposed to capture self-control problems are the hyperbolic discounting
model of Laibson (1997), the temptation model of Gul and Pesendorfer (2001), and the planner doer model of
Thaler and Shefrin (1981).
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the discrepancy between short term and long term discount rates falls with age predicting a
life-cycle developmental trend toward increased self-control. Read and Read (2004) is an ex-
perimental study which estimates hyperbolic discount functions for three different groups of
individuals: young adults, middle-aged, and old adults, with average ages of 25, 44, and 75.
The authors find that the discrepancy between the short-term and the long-term discount rates
is significantly higher for the young adults relative to the middle-aged. Similarly, this dis-
crepancy is significantly higher for middle-aged adults compared to the old adults group, for
which, they conclude the discrepancy virtually vanishes. Green et al. (1999) estimates hyper-
bolic discount functions for two groups of adults, young and old, with mean ages of 20 and 70
respectively, and finds that the discrepancy between short-term and long-term discount rates
that exists for young adults disappears as people get old.3
A third set of evidence for changing self-control problems comes from personality psychol-
ogy. As Ameriks et al. (2007) states ”personality psychologists associate self-control with consci-
entiousness, one of the ‘big five’ personality factors.”4 There is a long list of empirical studies in
personality psychology that show that conscientiousness, and in particular its lower-level facet,
self-control, changes with age.5 For example, in their survey article on personality development
in adulthood, Caspi et al. (2003) conclude that: ”it appears that the increase in conscientiousness
is one of the most robust patterns in personality development, especially in young adulthood.”
In this paper, we extend the traditional models of self-control to allow for varying degrees
of self-control problem over the life cycle, and study optimal capital taxation. In our model,
agents make consumption and savings decisions facing self-control problems at all ages. In
the last period of their lives, people make consumption and bequest decisions knowing that
they are going to be replaced by their offspring next period. We model preferences that exhibit
self-control problems through the quasi-hyperbolic discounting framework of Laibson (1997),
3For more empirical work on life-span analysis of inter-temporal discounting, see also Green et al. (1994) and
Green et al. (1996).
4Actually, Ameriks et al. (2007) validates this relationship between conscientiousness and the measure of self-
control used in the experiment (the EI gap) and finds that ”the data reveal a strong relationship between the
conscientiousness questions and the absolute value of the EI gap.”
5For example, see John et al. (2003) and Helson et al. (2002). Ameriks et al. (2007) also, through their experimen-
tal finding, show that there is a profound reduction in the scale of self-control and conscientiousness problems as
individuals age.
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which builds on the seminal works of Strotz (1955) and Phelps and Pollak (1968). We extend the
Laibson (1997) model by allowing for the degree of self-control problem to change over time.
We assume people are sophisticated, meaning they anticipate future self-control problems.
In this environment, we define efficient (or commitment) allocation as the allocation that
would arise in the absence of self-control problems. It is given by the solution to a fictitious
social planner’s consumption-saving problem where the planner future utilities exponentially.
In our environment, this preference corresponds to the preference of an initial generation par-
ent. The main exercise in this paper is to examine the optimal tax policy that implements the
efficient allocation. In this sense, this paper is a normative exploration of optimal paternalis-
tic tax policy regarding life-cycle saving behaviour. It is well-known that in models of quasi-
hyperbolic discounting there is multiplicity of equilibria.6 We restrict attention to the (unique)
linear Markov equilibrium of our economy.
We derive closed form formulas for optimal age-dependent capital taxes. Our closed form
solution represents the equilibrium obtainable as the limit of the equilibria of finite-period
economies. We show that optimal capital taxes can be positive as well as negative in different
periods of life and they can be increasing, decreasing, or changing non-monotonically with age,
depending on what we assume about the evolution of self-control problem over the life cycle.
This ambiguity result about the qualitative properties of optimal taxes shows that researchers
who take self-control problems seriously should also take the evolution of self-control problems
over the life cycle seriously before making policy suggestions. This result also questions the ba-
sic presumption in the literature that self-control problems always imply optimality of saving
subsidies, which, as we show, arises from the assumption of constant self-control over age.
Our closed form tax formulas are obtained assuming agents have constant elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution (CEIS) preferences. The formulas are valid (i) if CEIS coefficient is one
(the utility function is logarithmic) or (ii) for any CEIS coefficient if the economy is in a steady-
state. Using these formulas, we prove that if, as suggested by the available empirical evidence,
the degree of self-control increases with age, then capital should indeed be subsidised in all
periods. We also prove that, if self-control increases concavely with age, then optimal capital
subsidies should decreasewith age.
We study the quantitative effects of age-dependent self-control problems in a calibrated ver-
6For discussions of multiplicity of equilibria, see, among others, Laibson (1994) and Krusell and Smith (2003).
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sion of our model and find that the optimal subsidies in our model with decreasing self-control
problems are much larger than those implied by a model with constant self-control problems. We also
compare our optimal subsidies with those implied by the 401(k) plan. If we exclude the very
last periods before retirement - where the subsidy rate in the 401(k) essentially mimics the em-
ployer matching rate - the subsidy levels in the two cases are of comparable magnitudes. A
marked difference emerges however: the 401(k) plan implies an increasing pattern of subsidies
while the optimal subsidies decrease over the life cycle.
Our benchmark model assumes perfectly altruistic parents, making it equivalent to a stan-
dard infinite horizon framework. Section 3.1 allows for imperfect altruism and generalises our
optimal tax formulas to take into account the finite life time effects of Krusell et al. (2010). We
find that, in our model, the effect of age-dependent self-control dominates the finite time effect
induced by imperfect altruism: optimal capital subsidies decrease over the life cycle even when
parents do not care at all about their offsprings (i.e., when finite life time effect is the strongest).
In Section 3.2, we extend the finite horizon version of the model developed in Section 3.1 with
borrowing constraints to study the life-cycle consumption implications of our model. We find
that, even though our model abstracts from important life cycle issues such as child-rearing and
health, life-cycle consumption profiles implied by our calibrated self-control patterns capture
key features of empirical life-cycle consumption profiles fairly well.
Related Literature. Our paper is related to a number of recent papers that have explored the
implications of self-control problems for optimal paternalistic taxation. O’Donoghue and Rabin
(2003) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) analyse models of paternalistic taxation of unhealthy
goods. More closely related is Krusell et al. (2010), which analyses optimal taxation of sav-
ings in an economy where agents live finitely many periods and have self-control problems a`
la Gul and Pesendorfer (2001).7 First, they prove that the optimal policy prescriptions of the
quasi-hyperbolic model and the temptation model are identical when the utility function is log-
arithmic or when it is CEIS and the temptation parameter goes to infinity. Second, they show
that savings should be subsidised and that this subsidy should be increasing with time due to finite
life time effect.8 Our work differs from this paper most importantly by allowing for chang-
7Krusell et al. (2002) also analyse optimal taxation of savings under self-control problems but their main focus
is on an environment where the government as well as the people face issues of time-inconsistency.
8It is indeed straightforward to show that, in the infinite horizon version of their model, the subsidies would
be constant.
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ing levels of self-control problems over the life cycle: like all papers prior to ours, Krusell et al.
(2010) assume that the degree of self-control problem is constant over time. The implications of
modelling age-dependent self-control problems turn out to be significant. First, by assuming
empirically plausible patterns of self-control problems over the life cycle, we show, analytically,
that capital subsidies should actually be decreasing with age. Section 3.1 shows that this result
continues to hold even when we extend the model to take into account the finite life time effects
of Krusell et al. (2010). Second, we find that, for an agent with a given level of self-control prob-
lem, the age-dependence of self-control model imply much higher levels of optimal subsidies
relative to the ones implied by the constant self-control model.
Another important paper that is related to ours is Imrohoroglu et al. (2003) which studies
the role of social security in a model where agents have self-control problems. They consider a
rich overlapping generations model with uninsurable unemployment shocks and liquidity con-
straints, and find that social security is not very useful in helping agents solve their self-control
problems. Ours is a theory of capital subsidies under complete markets. One advantage of
our analysis is that, whenever utility is logarithmic, our results are robust to many dimensions
of heterogeneity - such as the life-cycle wage profile and the wealth distribution - whereas the
normative predictions in models with incomplete markets may obviously depend on all these
features.
As discussed above, an immediate implication of age-dependent self-control problems is
that capital taxes should be age-dependent. The age-dependence result is also a feature of two
sets of earlier contributions that analyse benefits of age-dependent capital income taxes with
time-consistent agents. First, in the Ramsey taxation tradition, Erosa and Gervais (2002) shows
that, in life-cycle economies, if the government has access to age-dependent linear capital and
labor income taxes, the resulting optimal tax system features age-dependence both for capital
and labor income. Second, the NewDynamic Public Finance literature calls for age-dependence
in optimal capital and labor income tax codes (e.g., Farhi and Werning (2013) and Golosov et al.
(2011)). The forces generating age-dependence in the current paper, however, are completely
different from the forces in these papers.9 Therefore, our paper complements this literature by
9The optimality of age-dependence in Erosa and Gervais (2002) is a direct implication of time-dependent con-
sumption and labor plans that is valid even in the steady state due to life cycle changes in people’s productivity.
In the NewDynamic Public Finance models, capital is taxed in order to deter people from joint deviation of saving
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providing a new mechanism through which capital taxes should depend on age. As such, in
this paper, the life-cycle pattern of optimal capital taxes depends on features of the environment
that are neglected by these papers.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 1 lays down the basiline model whereas
Section 2 analyses optimal subsidies both qualitatively and quantitatively. In Section 3, we
consider imperfect altruism extension and the life-cycle consumption implications of of the
calibrated self-control model. Section 4 concludes. The proofs of propositions, the procedure
we employ to approximate quasi-hyperbolic discount functions, and the analysis of optimal
subsidies under partial sophistication and in the presence of an illiquid asset are presented in a
separate online Appendix.
1 Model
The economy is populated by a continuum of a unit measure of dynasties who live for a count-
able infinity of periods, t = 1, 2, . . . , where each agent within a dynasty is active for I + 1 peri-
ods. In the first I periods, agents make consumption saving decisions facing different degrees
of self-control problems at different ages. In the last period of their lives, agents decide how
much to consume and bequeath to their offspring, who replace them in next period. People are
altruistic and they anticipate their offspring’s self-control problems.We use quasi-hyperbolic
discounting framework formalised by Laibson (1997) to model self-control problems as fol-
lows. An agent in his ultimate period of life (we refer to this agent as the parent hereafter) has
the following preferences over dynastic consumption stream:
u(c0) + δu(c1) + δ
2u(c2) + · · ·+ δ
Iu(cI) + δ
I+1u(c′0) + . . .
where c0, ci, and c
′
0 refer to the the consumption levels of the current parent, the offspring at
age i, and the offspring when he becomes a parent, respectively. u is the instantaneous utility
function and δ refers to both the discount factor and the altruism factor. The offspring has
and shirking. Since people at different ages (and contingencies) have different levels of accumulated wealth and
future prospects, they have different tendencies to save, and hence, the corrective taxes depend on age.
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different preferences at different ages. His preferences are given by
u(ci) + βiδ
[
u(ci+1) + δu(ci+2) + · · ·+ δ
I−iu(c′0) + . . .
]
, at age i ∈ {1, ..., I − 1},
u(cI) + β Iδ
[
u(c′0) + . . .
]
, at age I.
When βi = 1 for all i, all agents at all ages are time-consistent as there is no self-control problem.
Throughout the paper we will assume that βi < 1, meaning individuals postpone their planned
savings when the date of saving comes. Prior to the current paper, the literature has assumed
βi = β for all i, meaning the degree of self-control problem is constant as people age. Following
the large body of empirical findings provided by personality psychologists and experimental
studies, we allow for the severity of self-control problems, βi to depend on i. In the baseline
model, we assume people are fully sophisticated, meaning they fully anticipate the self-control
problems faced by future selves and descendants. In Appendix C, we analyse a version of the
model in which people are only partially aware of their self-control problems. 10
The instantaneous utility function, u, is of the CEIS form with elasticity parameter σ > 0 :
u(c) =
c1−σ
1− σ
, for σ 6= 1;
= log(c), else.
Production takes place at the aggregate level according to the function F(k, l), where k is ag-
gregate capital and l is aggregate labor. The production function satisfies the usual neoclassical
properties together with the Inada conditions:
F1, F2 > 0 ; F11, F22 ≤ 0; and lim
k→0
F1 = ∞; lim
k→∞
F1 = 0.
Labor is inelastically supplied, so at all dates l = 1. Define f (k) = F(k, 1) + (1− d)k, where d
refers to the fraction of capital that is forgone due to depreciation. There is a credit market in
which agents can trade one period risk-free bonds and capital as perfectly substitutable assets.
Since at any given date there is not cross-sectional heterogeneity, all agents have the same level
of asset holdings. Hence, letting bt be the amount of asset holdings of the agent alive in period
t, the credit market clearing condition is kt = bt.
10See Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) for behavioural evidence on partial sophistication.
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1.1 The Efficient Allocation
The efficient or – as we use interchangeably throughout the paper – the commitment allocation is
the allocation that would arise in the absence of self-control problems. It is given by the solu-
tion to a fictitious social planner’s consumption-saving problem where the planner discounts
exponentially with discount factor δ. In our environment, this preference corresponds to the
preference of an initial generation parent. By taking a long-term perspective and evaluating
welfare according to the initial parent’s preference, we are following much of the literature.11
The following Euler Equations characterise the efficient allocation, which we denote with an
asterisk throughout the paper:12
u′(c∗i ) = δ f
′(k∗i )u
′(c∗i+1), for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I − 1}, and (1)
u′(c∗I ) = δ f
′(k∗I )u
′(c′∗0 ), . . .
1.2 Implementing the Efficient Allocation
Since people in this economy face self-control problems, laissez-faire market equilibrium cannot
attain the commitment allocation. Our main interest in this paper is to find and characterise a
tax system that implements the commitment allocation in themarket environment. We call such
a tax system optimal. We proceed by defining a market equilibrium with taxes. It is important
to note that from the outset we restrict the set of taxes that are available to the government to
linear taxes on savings coupled with lump-sum rebates (throughout the paper we call this the
set of linear taxes). In general, it is not obvious that there is a linear tax system that implements
the efficient allocation. However, since we focus our attention to linear equilibria, a linear tax
system that implements the efficient allocation exists. We will verify this claim in Section 2.
1.3 Markov Equilibrium with Taxes
For notational simplicity, here in the main text, we only present the stationary version of the
model where the level of aggregate capital stock starts from its steady-state level, k. The prices
11See DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004), Gruber and Koszegi (2004) and O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006), for ex-
ample.
12We do not state the transversality condition but the commitment allocation will converge to a steady state with
positive capital as long as k0 > 0.
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at the steady state are given by
R = f ′(k) and w = f (k)− f ′(k)k. (2)
In such a world, the only index we need to carry around is the age index i. In Appendix A.1,
we provide the general setup where the economy starts from an arbitrary level of capital stock
and prices change over time. We prove our main result, Proposition 1, for the general case, and
show that if the utility function is logarithmic, then optimal taxes do not depend on whether
the economy is at a steady state or in a transition.
Let τi be the savings (capital) tax agent i = 0, 1, . . . , I pays. Tax proceeds are rebated in
a lump-sum manner in every period. Denote the lump-sum rebate in period i by Ti and let
τ = {τi, Ti}
I
i=0. For each set of taxes, we define the policy functions bi(·; τ) for i = 0, 1, . . . , I,
describing the optimal level of asset holdings of agent i given prices and taxes. When agent of
age n is deciding bn, his evaluation of the effect of his choice on bi, i > nwill be described by the
(nested) function bi(bi−1(...bn+1(bn; τ)...; τ); τ), which will be referred to as bi(...(bn)...)) so as to
simplify notation. In addition, in order to only deal with functions, we assume each agent’s
solution is unique, a property satisfied by our closed form solution involving linear policies. Of
course, in case of multiple solutions, our policy functions correspond to appropriate selections
from the policy correspondences.
A Stationary Markov equilibrium with taxes τ consists of a level of capital k, prices R,w, value
function V(·; τ) and policy functions {bi(·; τ)}
I
i=0 such that: (i) the prices satisfy (2); (ii) the value
functions and the policies are consistent with the parent’s problem described below; (iii) the government
budget is satisfied period-by-period and markets clear: Ti = Rτibi(k; τ) and bi(k; τ) = k for all i.
We now formally define the parent’s problem. LetV (b; τ) be the value of a parent’s problem
who had b units of assets in his last period before parenthood and faces the tax system τ. The
parent chooses his bequest b0 and does not have any direct control over b1, . . . , bI. Note that his
preferences are not aligned with his offspring’s (in a given period i, parent’s discount factor is δ
whereas offspring’s is βiδ). The parent foresees this misalignment of preferences, and correctly
forecasts future policies.
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The parent’s value and the policies are given by the solution to the following problem:
V (b; τ) = max
b0
u (R (1− τI) b+w+ TI − b0)
+δ
{
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu (R (1− τi) bi(...(b0)...) + w+ Ti − bi+1(...(b0)...)) + δ
IV (bI(...(b0)...); τ)
}
s.t. for all b0
b1(b0; τ) = argmax
bˆ1
u
(
R (1− τ0) b0 +w+ T0 − bˆ1
)
+ δβ1u
(
R (1− τ1) bˆ1 + w+ T1 − b2(bˆ1)
)
+δβ1
{
I−1
∑
i=2
δi−1u
(
R (1− τi) bi(...(bˆ1)...) + w+ Ti − bi+1(...(bˆ1)...)
)
+ δI−1V
(
bI(...(bˆ1)...); τ
)}
s.t. for all b1
b2(b1; τ) = argmax
bˆ2
u
(
R (1− τ1) b1 +w+ T1 − bˆ2
)
+ δβ2u
(
R (1− τ2) bˆ2 + w+ T2 − b3(bˆ2)
)
+δβ2
{
I−1
∑
i=3
δi−2u
(
R (1− τi) bi(...(bˆ2)...) + w+ Ti − bi+1(...(bˆ2)...)
)
+ δI−2V
(
bI(...(bˆ2)...); τ
)}
. . .
bI−1(bI−2; τ) = argmax
bˆI−1
u
(
R (1− τI−2) bI−2 + w+ TI−2 − bˆI−1
)
+δβ I−1
{
u
(
R (1− τI−1) bˆI−1 +w+ TI−1 − bI(bˆI−1)
)
+ δV
(
bI(bˆI−1); τ
)}
(3)
s.t. for all bI−1
bI(bI−1; τ) = argmax
bˆI
u
(
R (1− τI−1) bI−1 + w+ TI−1 − bˆI
)
+ δβ IV
(
bˆI ; τ
)
. (4)
To understand the nested nature of policies better, let us analyse the definition of policies
in (3) and (4). First, constraint (4) describes how self I chooses bI. This agent chooses bI an-
ticipating correctly that next period when he becomes a parent he will face an offspring with
self-control problems, and the offspring will face an offspring with self-control problems, and
so on. Second, consider constraint (3) which defines how self I − 1 chooses bI−1. Being sophis-
ticated, self I − 1 knows that his followers will have self-control problems. In particular, self
I − 1 knows that self I chooses bI according to (4). We have just seen that the last constraint,
(4), enters the parent’s problem in at least two ways: first, in the definition of self I’s policy
function and then as a constraint in the definition of self I − 1’s policy function. These two dif-
ferent constraints are represented by a single constraint, (4), because the parent and self I − 1′s
sophisticated belief agree about how self I will behave. Similarly, the constraint describing self
I − 1’s policy is also a constraint in the constraint that describes self I − 2’s policy, and self
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I − 2’s policy is also a constraint of self I − 3’s, and so on. Thus, actually the constraint that
describes the policy of self i enters parent’s problem in i different places but since these are all
identical constraints, we represent them with just one constraint that describes self i′s policy.
We restrict attention to linear equilibria, meaning equilibria in which policy functions are
linear in net present value of current wealth. Mathematically, defining Γi−1(b; τ) to be the net
present value of wealth available to an agent at the beginning of age i with asset level b and
under tax system τ, we derive closed form solutions of the form ci(b; τ) = Mi(τ)Γi−1(b; τ).
2 Optimal Taxes
In this section we analyse optimal capital taxes in the model introduced in Section 1. Proposi-
tion 1 characterises optimal taxes when utility is logarithmic.
Proposition 1 Suppose u(c) = log(c). The optimal taxes are given by:
1− τ∗i =
1
βi
(1− δ + βi+1δ) , for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I},
with β0 = β I+1 = 1.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.1.
The main task in proving Proposition 1 is to compute linear policies, Mi(τ), which we do
as follows. The assumption of linearity of policy functions implies that offspring’s problems at
all ages are strictly concave maximisation problems. This implies that the first-order optimal-
ity conditions are not only necessary but also sufficient. As a result, in the parent’s problem,
we can replace the constraints that take the form of maximisation problems with the corre-
sponding first-order optimality conditions. Using the the first-order approach and a version of
a guess and verify method, we find analytic expressions for the value function V and the vector
of constants Mi(τ) describing equilibrium linear policies. Then, we use the policy functions
to compute Euler equations that describe people’s optimality conditions regarding savings at
different ages in equilibrium. The comparison of these equilibrium Euler equations with the
planner’s Euler equations, given by (1), gives the optimal distortions (taxes) that need to be
created to implement the commitment allocation.
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It might be important to stress that - as shown in Appendix A.1. - Proposition 1 holds
regardless of whether the economy is in a steady state or in a transition. In particular, since
agents do not face binding liquidity constraints, the expressions for taxes hold for any life-cycle
path of wages. In Appendix C, we also prove that, under the logarithmic utility assumption, the
optimal taxes given by Proposition 1 are valid independent of whether we assume people are
aware of their future self-control problems or not.
Proposition 2 shows that if the economy is in a steady state, then the optimal taxes charac-
terised in Proposition 1 for the σ = 1 case are valid for any σ > 0.
Proposition 2 Assume k is such that δ f ′(k) = 1. Then, for any σ > 0, optimal taxes are given by the
exact same expressions as in Proposition 1.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.2.
The tax formula for in Proposition 1 consists of two components. The first component, 1βi , is
easier to understand. Because of his current self-control problem, self i discounts tomorrow by
an extra βi and hence wants to under-save relative to the efficient allocation. By factoring the
after tax return with 1βi , we can exactly offset the extra discounting, thereby getting rid of this
under-saving motive. We call this first part of the tax formula the current component. Clearly,
the current component is always greater than one, i.e., it always calls for a subsidy.
The second component of the tax formula, (1− δ + βi+1δ) , is there to correct deviations in
current savings caused by suboptimal actions of future selves. This part the tax formula, which
we refer to as the future component, is always less than one, meaning it calls for a tax on savings.
Intuitively, from self i’s perspective, self i+1 is under-saving due to his self-control problems
(βi+1 < 1.) Thus, self i’s welfare would go up if he can make self i+1 increase his savings, which
self i can achieve by increasing his own savings since, under our parametric assumptions, self
i+1’s savings is strictly increasing in self i’s savings. This discussion implies that self i has an
additional marginal benefit of saving in equilibrium when βi+1 < 1 relative to the case where
βi+1 = 1. It is this extra benefit that makes self i save more relative to the commitment level.
The future component of the tax formula calls for a tax in order to offset this extra return, and
ensure self i does not over-save. The reader might still feel puzzled by our argument: after
all, when facing the optimal taxes, self i + 1 saves the efficient amount. Notice, however, that
from self i’s perspective, self i + 1 is still under-saving (at the new price that is inflated by the
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subsidy), and hence future component of the tax is still needed.
Obviously, the sign of the optimal capital tax depends on whether the current or the future
component dominates. For constant self-control (i.e., βi ≡ β < 1), the current component
always dominates, implying an optimal negative tax (i.e., optimality calls for a saving subsidy).
We will see below that when βi changes with age, depending on the pattern of change, either
component may dominate, and the optimal tax can in general be positive or negative.
Notice that τ∗0 is only shaped by the future component. It is hence always positive. Since it
is applied to the wealth transferred to future generations, τ∗0 can be interpreted as a bequest tax.
In this paper, we do not analyse taxation of wealth transferred across generations. We study
this topic in detail in Pavoni and Yazici (2013b).
2.1 Lessons for Capital Taxation
Propositions 1 and 2 imply several general lessons for capital taxes which are summarised be-
low in a series of corollaries.
Corollary 3 (Age-dependence) Optimal capital taxes are age-dependent. In particular, depending on
how the degree of self-control changes with age: (i) Optimal capital taxes might be positive or negative at
different ages. (ii) Optimal capital taxes might be increasing or decreasing with age at different ages.
Proof. (i) For an example of τi > 0, set βi+1 ≈ 0 and βi > 1− δ. For an example of τi < 0, set
βi = βi+1 = β < 1. (ii) See the brown line with crosses in Figure 1 for an example.
The optimal capital taxes depend on age as long as the degree of self-control problems de-
pend on age. Figure 1 plots various life cycle profiles of self-control on the left panel and the
corresponding optimal taxes on the right panel. The figure shows that, under constant self-
control of β = 0.5, depicted by blue dots, the subsidy is also constant over the life cycle at
4%. Corollary 3 also states that, unlike the common presumption in the literature, it might be
optimal to tax people with self-control problems. However, although a theoretical possibility,
optimal capital taxes can be positive in our model only under parameter specifications that
seem to be inconsistent with data. Figure 1 shows that the model can generate a few periods
of positive optimal capital taxes only when βi declines sharply with age, as depicted by the
brown crosses. As we discuss in Section 2.2, increasing level of self-control problems with age
(βi declining with i) is at odds with empirical findings. The orange dashed line and the light
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blue solid line in Figure 1 display self-control patterns that are increasing with age. In both
cases, capital should be subsidised. Then, whether subsidies should increase or decrease with
age depends on the curvature of βi.
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Figure 1: Left panel: Examples of constant, decreasing, concave increasing and convex increasing pat-
terns self-control problems over the life cycle. Right panel: Corresponding optimal capital subsidies.
Corollaries 4 and 5 below characterise quite sharply the sign and the monotonicity proper-
ties of optimal capital taxes over the life cycle under the assumption that self-control problems
decrease concavely with age (βi is increasing and concave in i). This pattern is in line with
the available empirical evidence and agrees with the self-control profiles we calibrate in Sec-
tion 2.2.13 Corollary 4 shows that if the severity of self-control problems decline with age, then
13Several different strands of literature provide evidence on this pattern of self-control problems. First, re-
search on inter-temporal discounting over the life span has shown that short term discount rates fall with age
predicting a life-cycle developmental trend toward increased self-control. See, in particular, Green et al. (1999),
and Read and Read (2004). Second,Ameriks et al. (2007) finds that ’EI gap,’ the measure of self-control problem
used in the paper’s experiment, decreases concavely with age. Finally, personality psychologists associate self-
control with conscientiousness, one of the ‘big five’ personality factors, and in the words of Caspi et al. (2003) ‘it
appears that the increase in conscientiousness is one of the most robust patterns in personality development, espe-
cially in young adulthood.’ John et al. (2003) estimates conscientiousness as a quadratic function of age and finds
that the quadratic age term has a negative coefficient ‘indicating that the rate of increase [in conscientiousness]
was greater at younger ages than at older ages.’ Roberts et al. (2006) also estimates a concave conscientiousness
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capital should be subsidised at all ages.
Corollary 4 (Optimality of Capital Subsidies) If βi+1 ≥ βi, for all i ≥ 1, optimal capital tax is
negative for all ages.
Proof. 1− τ∗i =
1
βi
(1− δ + βi+1δ) >
βi+1
βi
≥ 1.
Corollary 5 shows that, if people’s ability to self-control increases concavely with age, then
capital subsidies should decrease with age.
Corollary 5 (Decreasing Capital Subsidies) If 0 ≤ βi+1 − βi ≤ βi − βi−1 for all i ≥ 1 (concavity),
then optimal capital subsidies decrease with age.
Proof. 1− τ∗i−1 =
1−δ
βi−1
+
βiδ
βi−1
>
1−δ
βi
+
βiδ
βi−1
>
1−δ
βi
+
βi+1δ
βi
= 1− τ∗i , where the first and second
inequalities follow from βi−1 < βi and βi+1 − βi ≤ βi − βi−1, respectively.
The result of Corollary 5 differs from Krusell et al. (2010) which concludes that in any finite
economy with constant self-control, capital subsidies should be increasing with age. The op-
timality of increasing subsidies in their case is due to the finite life time people face, and this
element is missing from our analysis due to our assumption of perfect altruism. In Section 3.1,
we show that the finite life time effect is quantitatively small within the relevant parameter
space, implying that the optimality of decreasing subsidies with age is generally optimal.
2.2 Quantitative Analysis
In this section, we quantitatively analyse optimal capital taxation over the life cycle assuming
either one of the justifications of the tax formulas in Proposition 1 hold: either utility is loga-
rithmic or the economy is at a steady state. In order to conduct a numerical analysis, we have
to choose values for the parameters of the model. Individuals are assumed to be born at the
real time age of 25 and they live 51 years, so they die at the end of age 75. Observe that the
tax formulas do not depend on the constant relative risk aversion coefficient σ, the shape of
the production function F, or the depreciation rate, d. Therefore, we do not specify values for
pattern.
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these parameters.14 The only parameter values needed for the analysis are the true yearly dis-
count factor δ and the evolution of self-control with age, {βi}
51
i=1. Here, βi represents the level
of self-control problem at real age of i+ 24.
We set the long-run yearly discount factor δ = 0.96. This value corresponds to the bench-
mark estimate in a constant self-control model with σ = 1 by Laibson et al. (2007). The self-
control vector, {βi}
51
i=1 , is calibrated as follows. We assume the relationship i → βi takes the
following functional form:
βi = a− d exp
{
51− i
b
}
. (5)
An advantage of this functional form over some other - perhaps simpler - forms is that it is
relatively easy to ensure that it satisfies a key condition of our model, namely βi ≤ 1 for all
i ∈ {1, ..., 51}.15 This form is also flexible in the sense that it allows for both concave and
convex and decreasing and increasing patterns of self-control over the life cycle. This flexibility
is important as we do not want to - a priori - put any restrictions on the self-control pattern. We
calibrate the parameters of the self-control function in (5) in two alternative ways.
RR Calibration. Read and Read (2004) conducts a survey with 129 respondents between the
ages of 19 and 89 in which respondents are asked to make a large number of time discounting
decisions on both computerised and paper-and-pencil questions. The study estimates hyper-
bolic discount functions for three age groups: young, middle-aged, and older adults, with mean
ages of 25, 44, and 75, respectively. Unlike quasi-hyperbolic discount functions, which have one
short-term and one long-term discount factors (β and δ), hyperbolic discount functions allow
many different discount factors depending on the length of delay for future reward. This im-
plies that the hyperbolic discount functions estimated in Read and Read (2004) are not readily
available for our study. Therefore, our calibration strategy works in two stages. First, for each
age group, we find the β that best approximates the hyperbolic discount function for that group.
We assume that the β at the mean age of a group is equal to the β that is approximated for that
group (for example, β at age 25 equals β of young adults). Second, we use the β for ages 25, 44,
14Observe that if we want the taxes computed using the formulas in Proposition 1 to be valid under any σ, then
we need to assure that the interest rate R or the deeper parameters of the production function F and d satisfy the
steady-state condition R = f ′(k) = F′(k, 1)− d = δ−1, where k refers to steady-state level of capital stock.
15To be precise, βi is bounded above by 1 with this functional form under the assumption that a = 1+ d. As we
see when we discuss our calibration exercises in the next section, this assumption is empirically supported.
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and 75 (or correspondingly for periods i = 1, 20, and 51) to pin down the parameters a, b, and d
of the functional form in (5).
For the older adults group, the approximation stage is quite simple because Read and Read
(2004) finds that the older adults group display exponential discounting. The authors write:
“Green et al’s major result- that younger people show hyperbolic discounting while older peo-
ple show exponential discounting - is supported by our data.” This implies that a single (long-
term) discount factor, δ, is sufficient to describe the behaviour of older adults, implying this
group has β = 1. Since age 75 corresponds to period 51 in our period, this gives us our first
calibration target, β51 = 1, which implies a = 1+ d when plugged in (5).
For the young adults and middle-aged groups, the approximation procedure chooses β us-
ing a least squares procedure: that is, β is chosen to minimise the sum of the squares of errors
between the yearly discount factors that are implied by the hyperbolic discount function and
our (δ, β) model. The details of our approximation procedure can be found in Appendix B.
The β′s that come out of our approximation procedure are 0.525 and 0.732 for the age 25 and
age 44 groups, respectively. Thus, we set β1 = 0.525 and β20 = 0.732 as the two other calibra-
tion targets. These two targets allow us to identify the remaining parameters of the self-control
function (5), b and d. The calibration targets and the calibrated parameter values are reported
in the upper panel of Table 1.
GMOCalibration. This calibration uses a strategy that is quite similar to RR calibration except
that the calibration targets come from two other studies. Two of the targets of GMO calibration
come from Green et al. (1999) which is an earlier paper that also uses an experimental approach
to estimate hyperbolic discount functions. They do so for two groups of adults: the young
and the old, with average ages of 20 and 70, respectively. Similar to Read and Read (2004),
Green et al. (1999) also finds that the inter-temporal discounting behaviour of their old adults
group can be best described by exponential discounting function. Therefore, we set β for this
group to be 1. Using the exact same approximation procedure we use in RR calibration, we find
β for the age 20 group to be 0.362. Then, we identify (5) for the 51 periods starting at age 20 and
ending at age 70. Thus, we set β1 = 0.362 and β51 = 1. The latter again implies that a = 1+ d
as in the RR calibration. We have two parameters, b and d to be identified and only one target
β1 = 0.362. We still need one more calibration target to identify b and d. We use the average
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RR Calibration
Parameters Targets Source
d=0.795 β at age 25 = 0.525 RR
b=106.74 β at age 44 = 0.732 RR
a=1+d β at age 75 = 1 RR
GMO Calibration
Parameters Targets Source
d=0.055 β at age 20 = 0.362 GMO
b=19.73 Average β = 0.818 LRT
a=1+d β at age 70 = 1 GMO
Table 1: This table reports the two alternative calibration exercises that we conduct for self-control
pattern over the life cycle. The acronyms GMO, LRT, and RR stand for Green et al. (1999), Laibson et al.
(2007), and Read and Read (2004), respectively. a, b and d are the parameters of the self-control function
in expression (5).
level of self-control problems in the economy, call it βavg, as an additional target. We take βavg
to be 0.818 in our benchmark analysis following the estimate of Laibson et al. (2007) for σ = 1
for a constant self-control model. The calibration targets and calibrated parameter values are
reported in the lower panel of Table 1.
It is important to notice that period 1 in GMO calibration does not refer to period 1 in our
model since in our model people are 25 in period 1 whereas people are 20 in period 1 of GMO
calibration. The period 1 in the calibration rather refers to the first period of calibrated self-
control function (5). Thus, the β of the agent in the first period of his life (at age 25) is equal to
β6 according to (5), which equals 0.517. Similarly, we need to determine β for agents between
the ages of 70 and 75 since the function (5) defines self-control problems only for the ages
between 20 and 70. Given that according to Green et al. (1999) self-control problems already
vanish by age 70, we set β = 1 for agents at ages between 70 and 75.
Now, we summarise our results.16 First, in both of our calibrations, self-control problems
decrease with age, and thus, it is always optimal to subsidise life-cycle savings. The red dots
16The matlab files used for all our simulations are available online. We refer to the README.pdf file for details.
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and the solid green line on the left panel of Figure 2 represent the RR and GMO calibrations
of the evolution of self-control problems over the life cycle, respectively. The corresponding
lines on the right panel display the corresponding optimal subsidies. In the RR calibration, the
optimal subsidies start about 6% and decrease slowly to about 1% at the end of the life cycle.
In the GMO calibration, the subsidies start at a significantly higher 8.5% but decrease more
sharply to 0% at the end of the life cycle. The optimality of declining subsidies in both cases is
expected given Corollary 4 and Corollary 5 and the concavely increasing pattern of βi with i in
both calibrations. The fact that GMO optimal subsidies start higher and decline more steeply is
due to the fact that the GMO self-control pattern is substantially more concave than that of RR.
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Figure 2: Left panel: Life cycle patterns of self-control problems under Read and Read (2004) (RR) and
Green et al. (1999) (GMO) calibrations. Right panel: Corresponding optimal subsidies.
We conduct sensitivity analysis with respect to our choice of functional form for the self-
control function given in (5). We do so by assuming a quadratic form: βi = Ai
2 + Bi + C. For
the RR calibration targets, the quadratic calibration gives a βi pattern that is virtually identical
to the original calibration. The implied optimal subsidies are virtually identical as well. For
the GMO calibration targets, the implied βi pattern rises strictly above one toward the end of
the life cycle and stays above one until the end. This is inconsistent with the evidence found
in both papers which calls for short term discount rates that are (weakly) larger than long term
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discount rates at all ages. The fact that quadratic function cannot be bounded above by one is
one of the reasons why we have adopted the functional form in (5).17
We conclude this section by summarising the general pattern of optimal taxes that emerges
in virtually all of our simulations: optimal taxes are negative, - i.e., they are in fact subsidies,
and these subsidies typically decline with age.
2.3 How Large Are the Optimal Subsidies Relative to Existing Ones?
Observe that in our computations the tax base is the gross return on asset holdings. Most actual
tax systems, however, tax asset income. If we translate our numbers into subsidies on capital
income, we find that optimal subsidy at age 25 is 217%, and subsidies decline to 10% by age
65.18 These are obviously large numbers. In this section, we compare these numbers with
existing saving subsidies in the United States.
Tax-deferred retirement accounts are the main channel through which savings are subsidised
in the United States. Probably, the most well-known tax-deferred saving account in the United
States is the classical 401(k). Each dollar invested into a classical 401(k) is deductible from
taxable income. Moreover, the taxes on the returns to 401(k) are deferred till retirement. This
means, instead of paying taxes on interest or dividend income earned every year, the person
pays tax based only on the income generated at the date of retirement, according to the tax rate
faced by the agent at that date. Moreover, it is quite likely that, at retirement age, contributors
face lower marginal taxes than when they invested into the plan. As we see below, this feature
may generate considerable saving subsidies, and, importantly, these subsidies depend onwhere
the agent is over her life cycle. Consider an agent who is at age i and is facing amarginal income
tax rate τ
y
C based on the income tax bracket she falls in currently. Suppose there are N periods
before she retires. If she invests $1 today in 401(k), with the current tax deduction, this is as if
she invests $ 1
1−τ
y
C
. If τ
y
R is the income marginal tax rate at retirement age, the agent will receive
17See Pavoni and Yazici (2013a) for an extensive sensitivity analysis of optimal subsidies regarding the levels of
β1 and βavg for the case of Green et al. (1999) calibration.
18Denoting the capital income tax by τki , the relation between our taxes and tax on capital income is given by:
1 − τki =
R(1−τi)−1
R−1 . As a consequence, for τ1 = −8.67% and τ41 = −0.41%, and under R = 1/1.04, we have
τk1 = −217% and τ
k
41 = −10%.
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$RN
1−τ
y
R
1−τ
y
C
at retirement. This implies a yearly saving subsidy of19
(
1− τ
y
R
1− τ
y
C
) 1
N
− 1. (6)
This saving subsidy depends on a person’s age in two ways. First, people’s income tend to
depend on where they are on their life cycle, which implies the tax deduction they receive,
τ
y
C, effectively depends on their age. Second, a person’s age determines how far away she is
from retirement, N, which clearly affects the subsidy rate in (6). Observe that in computing the
implied 401(k) subsidy rate in (6), we take the tax base as the gross return on asset holdings to
make it comparable to the optimal subsidies we have computed earlier in this section.
The 401(k) also allows employers to contribute to the worker retirement saving plans. The
most common methods of employer matching are the $1 per $1 up to 6% of pay and the $0.5 per
$1 up to 6% of pay.20 According to these options, if the saving rate is below 6%, then for each
dollar that a worker contributes to the 401(k) account, the employer contributes one (or, respec-
tively, one half) dollar. This means a worker investing one dollar is effectively investing $2
(1−τ
y
C)
into the plan when the employer matching is 1-to-1 and $1.5
(1−τ
y
C)
when the employer matching is
0.5-to-1. The formula in (6) can then be straightforwardly adapted to compute implied 401(k)
subsidies in the presence of employer matching.21
19The formula in (6) indicates that the implied subsidy rate of the 401(k) scheme is independent of the agent’s
saving rate. The 401(k) scheme, however, puts a cap on the amount agents can invest. In 2012, the maximal amount
for agents aged 50 or below was $17,000; older contributors faced an higher cap. The cap, however, is unlikely to
be binding for the median household with an average saving rate.
20According to a 2009 survey conducted by Hewitt Associates, $1 for $1 up to 6% pay is the most
common matching plan and is offered by 27% of all employers in their sample while $0.5 per $1 is
the second most common matching plan. ”Trends and Experience in 401(k) Plans.” Retrieved from
http://www.retirementmadesimpler.org/Library/Hewitt-Research-Trends-in-401k-Highlights.pdf
21Let a person’s annual income be w and his amount contributed to 401(k) be x. If x > 0.06w, meaning the person
is contributing more than 6% of his income, then in a one-to-one matching plan, the employer contributes 0.06w
dollars, which implies that for each dollar he invests he is effectively investing
x+ 0.06w
x(1− τ
y
C)
.
Therefore, in this case, the implied subsidy depends on the amount contributed. However, Thaler and Benartzi
(2004) report that the average saving rates into the SMarT plan (for the ‘control group’) are between 4.4% and 6.6%
(see page S174). Thus, in our computations of the implied 401(k) subsidies, we assume that contribution rate is
22
Now, we compare the saving subsidies implied by a typical 401(k) plan to the optimal sub-
sidies implied by our model. In Figure 3, right panel, we report the life-cycle profile of the
median income per household head - between 25 and 66 years of age - in the period 2000-2006
and the corresponding marginal tax rates implied by the 2006 income tax code.22 In Figure 3,
left panel, we report the implied saving subsidies for several 401(k) plans together with the
optimal subsidies given by our model under the two calibrations. Three observations are im-
mediate. First, interestingly, the range of values for the subsidies implied by the 401(k) plan are
not very different from the optimal ones. Second, the subsidies implied by the 401(k) plan are
very much age-dependent. Third, the life-cycle pattern of the 401(k) subsidies is qualitatively
very different from the optimal ones as they are increasing over the life cycle. Existing subsidies
appear too low for young individuals and too high for individuals close to retirement.
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Figure 3: Left panel: Optimal saving subsidies and subsidies implied by the 401(k) plan according to
marginal income tax rates in 2006, at different levels of employer matching. Right panel: Median income
of U.S. household head over life cycle in 2000-2006 and implied marginal income taxes in the year 2006.
less than 6% and use the formula explained in the main text.
22The data for the life-cycle profile of the median income per household head in the period 2000-2006 is taken
from Heathcote et al. (2010).
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2.4 Comparison to the Constant Self-Control Model
In this section, we compare the optimal capital subsidies obtained in our model to those one
would obtain in a model where self-control problems are constant over the life cycle. For the
sake of brevity, we only discuss the comparison for the GMO calibration. The thick green line
on the left panel of Figure 4 displays the GMO calibration whereas the thin (and flat) green line
displays the corresponding constant self-control pattern in which people have β = 0.818 at all
ages, which is the value that corresponds to average β in the GMO calibration.
The thin green line on the right-hand panel of Figure 4 displays that the optimal subsidies
in the constant self-control model are constant at slightly below 1%, at 0.89% to be precise. In
our GMO simulation, optimal capital subsidies start as high as 8.5% at the beginning of the
life cycle. The fact that our subsidies are higher than those in the constant self-control model
in the early years of the life cycle might not be very surprising since people have bigger self-
control problems at earlier ages in our model. What is perhaps more surprising is that the level
of optimal subsidies remain higher than the ones implied by the constant self-control model
until as late as age 55 even though the left panel of Figure 4 shows that at 55 the agent in our
model has significantly more self-control than the agent in the constant self-control model (with
a β difference of about 0.1). This indicates that our model implies larger subsidies for similar
levels of current self-control problems. The comparison at age 42 makes this point clearer: at
42, agents in both models have virtually the same level of β ≈ 0.82. As the right panel of Figure
4 displays, the optimal subsidy in our model at this age, 2.14%, is much higher than the optimal
subsidy in the constant self-control model, 0.89% (in terms of subsidies on capital income the
comparison is 54% vs. 22%).
To see why the optimal subsidies in our model are significantly larger than the ones in con-
stant self-control model, rewrite the optimal tax formula given by Proposition 1 as
−τ∗i = (1− δ)
(
1
βi
− 1
)
+ δ
βi+1 − βi
βi
. (7)
The expression (7) decomposes optimal subsidy formula into two components. The first com-
ponent is the optimal subsidy that arises in a model if the self-control problem remains constant
at the current level, βi. The second component is the additional amount of subsidy needed due
purely to the change in the level of self-control problems. Obviously, as long as self-control
problem is decreasing with age, βi+1 > βi, this term calls for additional subsidisation of sav-
24
ings. Since δ is typically close to one, the second component plays a quantitatively important
role in shaping capital subsidies and taxes.
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Figure 4: Left panel: Life cycle patterns of self-control problems under Read and Read (2004) (RR)
and Green et al. (1999) (GMO) calibrations, and under constant self-control model at β = 0.732 and
β = 0.818. Right panel: Corresponding optimal subsidies.
To grasp the intuition why our model implies higher subsidies, remember the decomposi-
tion of optimal taxes into the current and the future components, which we discuss following
Proposition 2. The current component is related to an agent’s current degree of self-control
problem and calls for under-saving. For agent at age 42, this component is the same between
our model and the constant self-control model. The future component summarises how much
a person over-saves to compensate for future self’s under-saving. Since people’s degree of self-
control improves with age in our model, the future component makes the agent save more
today in the constant self-control model relative to ours. As a result, an agent with the same
level of current self-control problem saves more in the constant self-control model, which im-
plies the required subsidy to make him save the right amount is going to be lower. Due to this
future component, optimal subsidies in our model remain higher than the one in the constant
self-control model even long after age 42 (until age 55).
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3 Imperfect Altruism and Life-Cycle Consumption Profile
In the main body of the paper, we have assumed that people are perfectly altruistic towards
their descendants. In Section 3.1, we remove this assumption and investigate the quantitative
importance of imperfect altruism on optimal subsidies. The main conclusion is that imperfect
altruism has little effect on both the level and pattern of optimal saving subsidies. In Section
3.2, we extend the finite life time version of the model developed in Section 3.1 by allowing
for borrowing constraints and use this model to study the life-cycle consumption implications
of our model. We find that, even though our model abstracts from important life cycle issues
such as child-rearing and health, life-cycle consumption profiles implied by our model under
calibrated self-control patterns capture the key properties of empirical life-cycle consumption
patterns fairly well.
3.1 Imperfect Altruism
Using a constant self-control model with sophisticated agents Krusell et al. (2010) find that opti-
mal saving subsidies should be increasingwith age if agents face finite life times. In our baseline
model, the finite life time channel, which calls for increasing subsidies with age, is shut down
by the perfect altruism assumption. We now consider an extended version of our model allow-
ing for imperfect altruism and assess its quantitative importance in shaping optimal subsidies
over the life cycle.
A parent has the following preferences over dynastic consumption streams
u(c0) + γ
[
δu(c1) + δ
2u(c2) + · · ·+ δ
Iu(cI) + δ
I+1u(c′0) + δ
I+1γ
[
δu(c′1) + δ
2u(c′2) + . . .
]
. . .
]
,
where this preference specification is equivalent to the one in the baseline model whenever the
altruism factor, γ, is equal to 1. When γ ∈ [0, 1), there is imperfect altruism. The finite life time
case of Krusell et al. (2010) corresponds to the case of γ = 0. The rest of the parent’s problem
is identical to the one in Section 1.3. Proposition 6 generalises the optimal tax formulas of
Proposition 1 to the case with a general altruism factor, γ. In the case of perfect altruism, γ = 1,
these formulas reduce back to the ones in Proposition 1.
Proposition 6 Suppose u(c) = log(c). For γ ∈ (0, 1], the optimal taxes are given by:
1− τ∗i =
1
βi
1+ βi+1δ
[
1+ δ + · · ·+ δI−i−2+ δI−i−1D
]
1+ δ + · · ·+ δI−i−1+ δI−iD
, for i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , I},
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where β0 = β I+1 = 1 and
D =
1+ δγ(1+ δ + · · ·+ δI−1)
1− δI+1γ
.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix A.3.
Figure 5 displays the quantitative effects of the finite life time channel on the monotonicity
properties of optimal subsidies. The red dots represent optimal subsidies under RR calibration
with γ = 1, whereas the dashed red line represents those under RR calibration but with γ = 0.
The comparison of the two lines shows that the finite life time effect is not strong enough to
overturn the optimality of subsidies declining with age. Similarly, the solid green line and the
dashed green line in Figure 5 display optimal subsidies under GMO calibration with γ = 1 and
γ = 0, respectively. The comparison in this case supports the earlier conclusion that optimal
subsidies decline with age even when we take into account the finite life time effect. Observe
that in both robustness exercises we set γ = 0. For γ ∈ (0, 1), the effect of finite life time on the
monotonicity properties of optimal subsidies would be even smaller.
We simulated ourmodel adopting several different parameterisations of γ, δ and i → βi. The
optimality of decreasing saving subsidies is quite robust (details are available upon request).
What seems to play an important role to maintain robustness of the decreasing subsidy result
under various values of γ is that, in our model, self-control problems vanish towards the end
of the life cycle. Notice that the only way in which γ enters the subsidy formula in Proposition
6 is via D. Early in the life cycle, optimal subsidies are not sensitive to γ because the subsidy
formula for early periods discounts D repeatedly. The optimal subsidy formula for later periods
does not discount D heavily, but this time βi+1 converges to one, and the second fraction on the
right-hand side of the subsidy formula converges to one, making optimal subsidies insensitive
to γ.
Observe that, in Figure 5, for each calibration, the optimal subsidies are uniformly higher
in the model with imperfect altruism than those implied by the model with perfect altruism.
Mechanically, this is because the parameter γ enters into the formula for 1− τ∗i in Proposition
6 only through the constant D. It is easy to show that D is increasing in γ, which implies
that the subsidy is decreasing in γ since the subsidy is decreasing in D. Intuitively, the second
term in the formula of 1− τ∗i in Proposition 6 (the future component) is there because agent i
disagrees with agent i+ 1 regarding how agent i+ 1 should discount consumption in period i+
2 and onwards relative to consumption in i+ 1 : from agent i′s perspective, the correct discount
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factor between consumption at date i + 1 and i + s is δs−1, whereas agent i + 1 discounts by
βi+1δ
s−1. To correct for the eventual under-saving of self i + 1, self i over-saves relative to the
efficient allocation, and to prevent this, the government taxes self i. If γ = 0, the disagreement
between self i and self i + 1 regarding the discounting between i + 1 consumption and future
consumption levels stop at the end of the current life cycle (D = 1), while for γ = 1, the
disagreement piles up for infinitely many generations (D = 11−δ ). As a result, when γ = 0,
there is less cumulative disagreement, which means self i is less motivated to over-save relative
to the efficient allocation, which implies the tax implied by the future component is lower.
Therefore, the overall subsidy is larger.
25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70 75
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
Age
−
τ
Capital Subsidies over Life cycle
 
 
RR, γ=1
RR, γ=0
GMO γ=1
GMO, γ=0
Figure 5: Left panel: Life cycle patterns of self-control problems under Read and Read (2004) (RR) and
Green et al. (1999) (GMO) calibrations with γ = 0 and γ = 1. Right panel: Corresponding optimal
subsidies.
3.2 Life-cycle Consumption Implications of Self-Control Calibration
Throughout the paper, we motivate and calibrate the life-cycle pattern of self-control using ex-
perimental data. In this section, we would like to document the life-cycle profile of consump-
tion implied by our model as a partial validation of our calibration exercise.
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We take Gourinchas and Parker (2002) (GP hereafter) as our empirical reference. GP com-
putes life-cycle profiles of mean annual real disposable income and consumption using Con-
sumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) data, employing synthetic cohort techniques.23 They con-
struct their variables from a sample of roughly 40,000 households from 1980 to 1993. A graphi-
cal representation of the income and consumption profiles they compute can be found in Figure
2 (page 67) in GP.
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Figure 6: The blue dashed line and the black circles represent the life-cycle profiles of mean disposable
income and consumption between 1980 and 1993 as fitted by Gourinchas and Parker (2002). The red
crosses and the green solid line represent the simulated consumption profiles implied by our model under
self-control problems given by RR and GMO calibrations, respectively. The dash-dot line represents
the life-cycle consumption profile of a planner who discounts exponentially and faces the same liquidity
constraints that households face.
Clearly, our simplemodel cannot have the ambition of matching the life-cycle pattern of con-
sumption as closely as GP does. In particular, we abstract from income and health uncertainty,
and from all life cycle changes other than income and self-control. We assume households face
23Consumption is obtained by subtracting expenditure on education, medical care, and mortgage interest pay-
ments from total household expenditure. Disposable labor income is obtained by subtracting Social Security tax
payments, pension contributions, after tax asset and interest income, and those expenditures subtracted from con-
sumption from after-tax family income.
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a deterministic path of labor income which corresponds to the life-cycle profile of income con-
structed in GP. We also impose a constant (and exogenous) gross return to savings, R, and a
simple form of liquidity constraints: households cannot borrow at all. To be consistent with GP,
and given that our target is to get a life-cycle profile of consumption, we move away from the
infinite horizon model and assume households are not altruistic (γ = 0). We use this model to
compute two alternative life-cycle consumption profiles, one assuming self-control problems
evolve according to our RR calibration and another one according to GMO calibration. We set
the remaining parameters as follows. Agents are assumed to have logarithmic utility and we
set R = 1.0344 and δ = 1R .
24 Consistently with GP, agents start their working life at age 26 and
retire at 65. People begin their lives with zero assets. After retirement, agents are assumed to
leave for 10 more years and we set retirement income to zero.25
Figure 6 depicts life-cycle consumption profiles coming from RR and GMO simulations (red
dots and solid green line, respectively), together with life-cycle (fitted) income and consump-
tion profiles (blue dashed line and black circles, respectively) constructed in GP. All series are
plotted for the age range between 26 and 65.26 Figure 6 shows that both RR and GMO calibra-
tions of self-control profiles imply reasonable life-cycle consumption profiles. In particular, our
simple model of self-control is able to generate the concave pattern of consumption we observe
in the data. It matches the declining pattern of consumption in the second part of the life cycle
fairly well (for the GMO calibration the fit is, in fact, - surprisingly - quite remarkable), while
24We assume logarithmic utility mainly in order to use our closed form solutions; nonetheless, the relative risk
aversion coefficient of one is well in the range estimated by GP, 0.5 to 1.4, depending on the exact specification of
the model. The value of R is chosen to be consistent with GP, which estimates an average real return of 3.44% for
Moody’s AAA municipal bonds over the sample period.
25 GP does not guide us regarding the length of retirement period or retirement income as it reports neither of
them, and estimates a value of retirement and the implied ‘retirementwealth’ to best match moments on consump-
tion and savings. Instead of choosing these values to optimise the model’s fit, we set retirement income to zero
and retirement length to 10 years. For both calibrations, the consumption profiles simulated using the model with
20 years of post retirement life - not report for ease of graphical exposition - are virtually identical to the profiles
obtained from the 10 years model.
26Given the hump shaped pattern of income and the decreasing pattern of self-control, in all parametrisations,
agents are liquidity constrained early in life. After they start saving, they never become liquidity constrained
again. This characteristic of the model allows us to use the machinery we developed to solve the model without
liquidity constraints (leading to the closed form solution for taxes) to solve this model with liquidity constraints.
Further details on the numerical algorithm are available upon request.
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it is unable to match the flatter pattern of consumption we observe in the data during the first
part of the life cycle. GP argues that precautionary savings and measurement error play a cru-
cial role in explaining the consumption profile in the initial segment of the life cycle while our
model postulates deterministic income.27
It might be worthwhile discussing the optimal taxes implied by the model with liquidity
constraints. The black dash-dot line in Figure 6 represents the life-cycle consumption profile of
a planner who discounts exponentially and faces the same liquidity constraints that households
face. This is the commitment consumption profile that optimal subsidies target under borrow-
ing constraints. The figure shows that the consumption patterns of the commitment allocation
and the self-control model (for both calibrations) coincide until age 34. The optimal subsidies in
the borrowing constraint model starting with age 34 coincides with the optimal subsidies given
by Proposition 6 (for γ = 0) since after this period the commitment allocation requires people to
save. The optimal subsidies after age 34 corresponds to that shown by the thin dotted (green or
red depending on the calibrations) lines in Figure 5. During the ages between 25 and 34, the op-
timal subsidies are indeterminate. Intuitively, as long as subsidies are not too high during these
years, people will be borrowing constrained, and consume exactly their labor income, which is
what we see in the commitment allocation. Notice that, the subsidies given by Proposition 6
are optimal for these years as well as they lie within the range of optimal subsidies.
4 Conclusion
This paper studies optimal capital taxation in an economy where agents face self-control prob-
lems. In line with evidence suggested by personality psychology and experimental studies,
we allow for the severity of the self-control problem to change over the life cycle. We restrict
attention to CIES utility functions and focus on linear Markov equilibria. We derive explicit
formulas which allow us to compute optimal taxes given the evolution of self-control problem
over the life cycle. We show that if agents ability to self-control increases concavely with age,
27On page 49, GP writes: “The importance of the precautionary motive early in life implies that between 60 and 70
percent of non-pension wealth is due to precautionary savings, according to poor estimates and holding the real interest rate
fixed.” On page 67, GP also writes: “Consumption lies above income over the late twenties. Given that the CEX wealth
data, and better household wealth surveys, show modest increases in liquid wealth over these ranges, this feature seems likely
due to misreporting of income or consumption.”
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then capital should be subsidised and the subsidy should decrease with age.
In our calibrated quantitative exercises, we find that optimal capital subsidies start some-
where between 6% and 8% at the beginning of the life cycle and decline monotonically with
age to somewhere between 0% and 1%. If we translate the subsidies on capital into subsidies
on capital income, these are very large numbers. Perhaps more importantly, we show they are
much larger than the savings subsidy we would obtain in models with constant self-control, at
most ages. Our model is probably too simple for delivering precise policy predictions. Never-
theless, our analysis suggests that researchers who take self-control problems seriously should
also carefully measure the evolution of self-control problems over the life cycle before making
policy suggestions.
We also compare our optimal subsidies with those implied by the 401(k) plan. If we exclude
the very last periods before retirement - where the subsidy rate in the 401(k) essentially mimics
the employer matching rate - the subsidy levels in the two cases are of comparable magnitudes.
A marked difference emerges, however, in the life-cycle pattern of optimal subsidies: the 401(k)
plan implies an increasing pattern of subsidies while the optimal subsidies decrease over the
life cycle.
In Appendix C, we extend the model by allowing for different degrees of self awareness
(partial sophistication) about the existence of future self-control problems. We first prove that
when utility function is logarithmic, the optimal tax formulas are independent of the pattern
of partial sophistication. When CEIS coefficient is different from one, closed form solutions
for optimal taxes are unavailable. Our numerical experiments show that, as long as the level
of sophistication is not changing abruptly from one period to another, the pattern of optimal
capital subsidies over the life cycle is surprisingly robust to the degree of sophistication.
The existence of illiquid assets does not change our optimal tax results as long as there are
no borrowing constraints. More precisely, in Appendix D we use a three periods example to
show that a tax system that is optimal in an environment without illiquid assets is still optimal
in the same environment with an illiquid asset as long as we complement the tax system with
an appropriate tax on the illiquid asset.
Nicola Pavoni, Department of Economics, Bocconi University, via Roentgen 1, 20136 Milan, Italy
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1.
In this section, we provide the proof of our main result, Proposition 1, for the general setup where the
economy starts from any initial level of capital stock and prices change over time. In order to do so, we
first define the parent’s problem under taxes in the general setup.
Preparation to the proof.
Let k0 be the initial level of capital stock and {k∗t }t be the sequence of the efficient capital levels that
start from k0. We know that the commitment allocation is recursive in kt. Let K : IR→ IR be the function
describing the evolution of the aggregate level of capital in the commitment allocation:
k∗t+1 = K(k
∗
t ).
Agents face a price sequence satisfying:
R(kt) = f
′(kt),
w(kt) = f (kt)− f
′(kt)kt,
that is, it is generated by a capital stock sequence {k∗t }t where the capital stock is generated by K. Since
the problem is recursive, a government which aims to implement the efficient allocation will use the
same taxes in any two periods if the age of the agent and the capital stock in those periods are the
same. Therefore, without loss of generality, we define taxes as functions of age and capital stock as
∗Bocconi University, IGIER, IFS, and CEPR. E-mail: nicola.pavoni@unibocconi.it
†Sabanci University. E-mail: hakkiyazici@sabanciuniv.edu
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follows: τi(kt) is the savings (capital) tax agent at age i = 0, 1, .., I pays if the capital stock in that period
is kt. Government (per-period) budget feasibility requires the lump-sum rebate to satisfy: Ti(kt) =
R(kt)τi(kt)bi(kt; τ).
To describe the problem of the agents, we define the policy functions bi(·, kt ; τ) describing the op-
timal behaviour of the agent i as function of bi−1 given the level of aggregate capital kt, the taxes
τ := {τi(·), Ti(·)}i and what he believes other agents’ rules will be, and that the evolution of capital
follows the rule K. When agent n is deciding bn, his evaluation of the effect of his choice on bi, i > n
will be described by the function bi(bi−1(...bn+1(bn, k
∗
t ; τ)...), k
∗
t+i−n−1; τ), k
∗
t+i−n; τ), where for all t, s, we
define k∗t+s = K(K(...(k
∗
t )...)), where the K function has been applied s times. To simplify notation, we
will denote this mapping simply as bi(..(bn)..)).
Finally, our notation will be simplified if we let k be the level of capital stock already in place in
the last period of a parent and k′ or k1 refer to the capital stock next period and ki refer to the level
of capital stock i periods after the period in which capital stock was k, namely: ki = K(K(...(k)...)),
where the function K has been applied i times. In the problem below, the function K is fixed to that
of the commitment allocation. Of course, the function describing the evolution of aggregate capital in
equilibrium is part of the fixed point argument as it must satisfy market clearing.
Parent’s Problem along the Transition
V (b, k; τ) = max
b0
u (R(k) (1− τI) b+ w(k) + TI − b0)
+δ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu
(
R(ki+1) (1− τi) bi(...(b0)...) +w(k
i+1) + Ti − bi+1
)
+ δIV
(
bI(...(b0)...), k
I+1; τ
)]
s.t. for all b0
b1(b0, k
1; τ) = argmax
bˆ1
u
(
R(k1) (1− τ0) b0 + w(k
1) + T0 − bˆ1
)
+δβ1
[
∑
I−1
i=1 δ
i−1u
(
R(ki+1) (1− τi) bi(...(bˆ1)...) + w(k
i+1) + Ti − bi+1(...(bˆ1)...)
)
+ δI−1V
(
bI(...(bˆ1)...), k
I+1; τ
) ]
s.t. for all b1
b2(b1, k
2; τ) = argmax
bˆ2
u
(
R(k2) (1− τ1) b1 +w(k
2) + T1 − bˆ2
)
+δβ2
[
∑
I−1
i=2 δ
i−2u
(
R(ki+1) (1− τi) bi(...(bˆ2)...) + w(k
i+1) + Ti − bi+1(...(bˆ2)...)
)
+ δI−2V
(
bI(...(bˆ2)...), k
I+1; τ
) ]
s.t. for all b2
...
s.t. for all bI−2
bI−1(bI−2, k
I−1; τ) ∈ argmax
bˆI−1
u
(
R(kI−1) (1− τI−2) bI−2 + w(k
I−1) + TI−2 − bˆI−1
)
+δβ I−1
[
u
(
R(kI) (1− τI−1) bˆI−1 +w(k
I) + TI−1 − bI(...(bˆI−1)...)
)
+ δV
(
bI(...(bˆI−1)...), k
I+1; τ
)]
s.t. for all bI−1
bI(bI−1, k
I ; τ) = argmax
bˆI
u
(
R (1− τI−1) bI−1 +wI−1 + TI−1 − bˆI
)
+ δβ IV
(
bˆI , k
I+1; τ
)
,
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where bi(...(bi)...) = bi.
Letting bi and k
i+1 be the saving level in period i and aggregate capital stock in period i + 1, define
(we disregard the tax dependence for notational simplicity):
Γi(bi, k
i+1) = R(ki+1)(1− τi(k
i+1))bi +w(k
i+1) + Ti(k
i+1) + Gi(k
i+1),
Gi(k
i+1) =
Ti+1(k
i+2) + w(ki+2)
R(ki+2) (1− τi+1(ki+2))
+
Ti+2(k
i+3) +w(ki+3)
i+3
∏
j=i+2
R(kj)
(
1− τj−1(kj)
) + ...+ TI(k
I+1) +w(kI+1)
I
∏
j=i+2
R(kj)
(
1− τj−1(kj)
) + ...,
ci+1(bi, k
i+1) = Mi+1Γi(bi, k
i+1),
where Gi(k
i+1) is the total net present value of future lump-sum taxes and wages, and Γi(bi, k
i+1) is the
net present value of wealth available to agent at the beginning of age i + 1 when the level of aggregate
capital stock today is ki+1, the agent saved bi in the previous period, and Mi+1 is the fraction consumed
out of that wealth. It follows from the flow budget constraint in period i+ 1 that if the stated consump-
tion rule is part of an optimal policy, agent’s saving in period i+ 1 must satisfy for all bi:
bi+1(bi, k
i+1; τ) = R(ki+1)
(
1− τi(k
i+1)
)
bi + w(k
i+1) + Ti(k
i+1)−Mi+1Γi(bi, k
i+1).
Note that, using
∂bi+1(bi, k
i+1; τ)
∂bi
= R(ki+1)
(
1− τi(k
i+1)
)
−Mi+1
∂Γi(bi, k
i+1)
∂bi
= (1−Mi+1)R(k
i+1)
(
1− τi(k
i+1)
)
,
it is relatively simple algebra to show that, under the consumption rule given above, net present value
of wealth between any two consecutive periods is related as follows: for all i = 1, ..., I
Γi(bi(bi−1, k
i; τ), ki+1) = R(ki+1)(1− τi(k
i+1))(1−Mi)Γi−1(bi−1, k
i) (1)
and
Γ0(b0(b, k; τ), k
1) = R(k1)(1− τ0(k
1))(1−M0)ΓI(b, k),
where
ΓI(b, k) = R(k)(1− τI(k))b+ w(k) + TI(k) + GI(k)
is the net present value of wealth available to the parent when the level of aggregate capital stock today
is k and the parent saved b in the previous period.
Using the above recursion, it is possible to express consumption as follows:
ci+1(bi(..(b)..), k
i+1) = Qi(k)Mi+1ΓI (b, k) ,
where bi(...(b)...) is the shortcut for the nested policy we describe above and
Qi(k) := Π
i
s=0 (1−Ms) R(k
s+1)
(
1− τs(k
s+1)
)
,
with ks+1 = K(...(k)...), where the map K is applied s+ 1 times as usual.
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Now using linearity of the policy functions and the first-order approach, we can rewrite the parent’s
problem as:
V (b, k; τ) = max
M0
u (M0ΓI (b)) + δ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu (Qi(k)Mi+1ΓI (b)) + δ
IV
(
(1−MI)QI−1(k)ΓI (b) , k
I+1; τ
)]
(2)
s.t. for all i ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}
(MiQi−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−σ= δβi

 R(ki+1)(1− τi(ki+1))

 ∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1)
(
MjQj−1(k)ΓI (b, k)
)−σ
Mj
Q j−1(k)
Qi(k)
+δI−iV ′(bI(..(b)..), k
I+1; τ)(1−MI)
QI−1(k)
Qi(k)




(MIQI−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−σ = δβ IV
′
(
bI(..(b)...), k
I+1; τ
)
.
Core proof of Proposition 1.
Wewill prove that facing the sequence of efficient capital levels and the taxes specified in Proposition
1, people will choose the efficient allocation, thereby verifying both (1) that the sequence of the efficient
capital levels is actually part of equilibrium under the taxes described in Proposition 1, and (2) that under
the taxes specified by Proposition 1, people choose the efficient allocation.
Guess
V (b, k; τ) = D log(ΓI (b, k)) + B(k),
where D and B are constants of the parent’s value function.
Now, we compute the coefficients for parent’s value function, D.
Compute V ′ in terms of D using the guess for value function above:
V ′(bI(..(b)..), k
I+1; τ) = DR(kI+1)(1− τI(k
I+1))(ΓI(b, k)QI(k))
−1, (3)
where we used the recursion (1).
Plugging (3) in the constraints described in problem (2) and using the definition of Qi, these con-
straints become: for all i ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}:
(MiQi−1(k))
−1 = δβiR(k
i+1)(1− τi(k
i+1)) (Qi(k))
−1
[
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
]
,
and
(MIQI−1(k))
−1 = δβ IR(1− τI(k
I+1)) (QI(k))
−1
D.
Now, using the marginal condition describing self-I behaviour, it is easy to show that
MI(D) =
1
1+ β IδD
.
Similarly, use other constraints defining the policies to compute Mi(D) for i = 1, .., I − 1 :
Mi(D) =
1
1+ βiδ
(
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
) .
4
Taking first-order condition with respect to bequests in the parent’s problem (2) and plugging in the
Mi(D) from above, we get:
M0(D) =
1
1+ δ
(
∑
I−1
j=0 δ
j + δID
) .
Now, we verify the value function to compute D :
D log (ΓI (b, k)) + B(k) = log (M0(D)ΓI (b, k))
+δ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δi log (Qi(k)Mi+1(D)ΓI (b, k)) + δ
I
{
D log (ΓI (b, k)QI(k)) + B(k
I+1)
}]
,
which implies
D =
I
∑
i=0
δi + δI+1D
and hence
D =
1
1− δ
.
By plugging D in the formula for Mi(D), we compute
Mi =
1− δ
1− δ + βiδ
, for all i ∈ {1, .., I}, (4)
M0 = 1− δ.
Now we turn to taxes that implement the efficient allocation. The constraint that describes self-i’s
behaviour for i ∈ {1, .., I− 1} becomes the following once we plug in the derivative of the value function
from (3) :
(MiQi−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δβiR(k
i+1)(1− τi(k
i+1)) (Mi+1Qi(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1
[
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
]
Mi+1.
(5)
The comparison of (5) with the efficiency condition (1) in the main text gives the optimal tax as:
(
1− τ∗i (k
i+1)
)
=
1
βi
([
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
]
Mi+1
)−1
=
1
βi
(1− δ + βi+1δ) .
For self-I, the constraint describing his behavior in problem (2) reads as follows:
(MIQI−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δβ IR(k
I+1)(1− τI(k
I+1)) (M0QI(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1
DM0,
and the comparison of this with the efficiency condition gives
(
1− τ∗I (k
I+1)
)
=
1
β I
.
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Finally, a comparison of the following first-order condition of the parent
(M0ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δR(k1)(1− τ0(k
1))(M1Q0(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1
[
∑
I−1
i=0 δ
i + δID
]
M−11
with the corresponding optimality condition gives
1− τ∗0 (k
1) = (1− δ + β1δ) .
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2.
If we plug in the constraint defining the policy of the agent at age i+ 1 in the constraint of agent at age
i, we get:
u′ (ci) = δβiR(1− τi)u
′ (ci+1)

1+ ∂bi+1(bi)∂bi
(
1
βi+1
− 1
)
R(1− τi)

 ,
which renders optimal taxes as:
(1− τ∗i ) =
1
βi
1
1+
∂bi+1(b
∗
i )
∂bi
(
1
βi+1
−1
)
R(1−τ∗i )
.
Under CEIS utility and linear policies, we have:
∂bi+1(bi)
∂bi
= (1−Mi+1)R(1− τi).
Now plug this in the tax formula above to get the CEIS specific tax formula:
(1− τ∗i ) =
1
βi
1
1+ (1−M∗i+1)
(
1
βi+1
− 1
) . (6)
When Rδ = 1, in the efficient allocation we have c∗i = c
∗
i+1 for all i. This means
c∗i = M
∗
i Γi−1(b
∗
i−1) = c
∗
i+1 = M
∗
i+1Γi(b
∗
i )
which, using the relationship Γi(bi) = R(1− τi)(1−Mi)Γi−1(bi−1) implies
M∗i =
M∗i+1R(1− τ
∗
i )
1+ M∗i+1R(1− τ
∗
i )
. (7)
Plugging (6) in (7), we get a system of (I + 1) equations in (I + 1) unknowns (M∗0 , ...,M
∗
I ) that fully pin
down agents policies when they face optimal taxes, for the CEIS case:
M∗i =
M∗i+1R
1
βi
1
1+(1−M∗i+1)
(
1
βi+1
−1
)
1+ M∗i+1R
1
βi
1
1+(1−M∗i+1)
(
1
βi+1
−1
)
Clearly, the solution to this system does not depend on σ. In fact, it is easy to show that the logarithmic
utility solution given by equation (4) satisfies the above system of equations, meaning it is an equilib-
rium. Plugging (4) in the formula for taxes, (6), we get that optimal taxes are the same as the logarithmic
utility case.
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 6.
The proof of Proposition 6 follows the proof of Proposition 1 very closely. The important difference is
that the altruism factor, γ, can be any number in [0, 1]. In this case, the maximiation problem of the parent
is identical to (2), except that the objective function has the general altruism factor:
V (b, k; τ) = max
M0
u (M0ΓI (b))+γδ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu (Qi(k)Mi+1ΓI (b)) + δ
IV
(
(1−MI)QI−1(k)ΓI (b) , k
I+1; τ
)]
.
(8)
We will prove that facing the sequence of efficient capital levels and the taxes specified in Proposition
6, people will choose the efficient allocation, thereby verifying both (i) that the sequence of the efficient
capital levels is actually part of equilibrium under the taxes described in Proposition 6, and (ii) that under
the taxes specified by Proposition 6, people choose the efficient allocation.
Guess
V (b, k; τ) = D log(ΓI (b, k)) + B(k),
where D is the constant of the parent’s value function.
Compute V ′ in terms of D using the guess for value function:
V ′(bI(..(b)..), k
I+1; τ) = DR(kI+1)(1− τI(k
I+1))(ΓI(b, k)QI(k))
−1,
where we used the recursion (1).
Plugging these in the constraints described in problem (2), we get for all i ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}:
(MiQi−1(k))
−1 = δβiR(k
i+1)(1− τi(k
i+1)) (Qi(k))
−1
[
I
∑
j=i+1
δj−(i+1) + δI−iD
]
and
(MIQI−1(k))
−1 = δβ IR(1− τI(k
I+1)) (QI(k))
−1
D.
Now, using the marginal condition describing self-I behaviour, it is easy to show that
MI(D) =
1
1+ β IδD
.
Similarly, use other constraints defining the policies to compute Mi(D) for i = 1, .., I − 1 :
Mi(D) =
1
1+ βiδ
{
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
} . (9)
Taking first-order condition with respect to bequests in the parent’s problem (2) and plugging in the
Mi(D) from above for all i, we get:
M0(D) =
1
1+ δ
(
∑
I−1
j=0 δ
j + δID
) .
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Now verify the value function to compute D :
D log (ΓI (b, k)) + B(k) = log (M0(D)ΓI (b, k))
+γδ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δi log (Qi(k)Mi+1(D)ΓI (b, k)) + δ
I
{
D log (ΓI (b, k)QI(k)) + B(k
I+1)
}]
,
which implies
D = 1+ γδ
(
I−1
∑
i=0
δi + δID
)
and hence
D =
1+ γδ ∑I−1i=0 δ
i
1− δI+1γ
.
Now we turn to taxes that implement the efficient allocation. The constraint that describes self-i’s be-
haviour for i ∈ {1, .., I− 1} becomes the following once we plug in the derivatives of the value functions
from (3) :
(MiQi−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δβiR(k
i+1)(1− τi(k
i+1)) (Mi+1Qi(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1
[
I
∑
j=i+1
δj−(i+1) + δI−iD
]
Mi+1.
(10)
The comparison of (10) with the efficiency condition (1) in the main text gives the optimal tax as:
1− τ∗i (k
i+1) =
1
βi
([
I
∑
j=i+1
δj−(i+1) + δI−iD
]
Mi+1
)−1
,
which, using (9), implies
1− τ∗i (k
i+1) =
1
βi
1+ βi+1δ
(
1+ δ + ...+ δI−i−2 + δI−i−1D
)
1+ δ + ...+ δI−i−1 + δI−iD
.
For self-I, the constraint describing his behaviour in problem (2) reads as follows:
(MIQI−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δβ IR(k
I+1)(1− τI(k
I+1)) (M0QI(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 DM0,
and the comparison of this with the efficiency condition gives
1− τ∗I (k
I+1) =
1
β I
.
Finally, a comparison of the following first-order condition of the parent
(M0ΓI (b, k))
−1 = γδR(k1)(1− τ0(k
1))(M1Q0(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1
[
∑
I−1
i=0 δ
i + δID
]
M−11
with the corresponding optimality condition gives
1− τ∗0 (k
1) =
1+ β1δ
(
1+ δ + ...+ δI−2 + δI−1D
)
1+ δ + ...+ δI−1 + δID
.
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B Approximating Hyperbolic Discount Functions with Quasi-
hyperbolic Discount Functions
Green et al. (1999) and Read and Read (2004) are two studies that collect experimental data and use it to
estimate inter-temporal discount functions for different age groups. In this section, we explain how we
approximate our quasi-hyperbolic discount functions for those age groups using the hyperbolic discount
functions estimated in Green et al. (1999) and Read and Read (2004).
Green et al. (1999) estimates (11) for two adult age groups (young and old adults). Read and Read
(2004) estimates (11) for three adult age groups (young, middle-aged, and old). A key finding in both
Green et al. (1999) and Read and Read (2004) is that the old adults groups in both studies discount future
exponentially.
For the rest of the age groups, both papers find that the following class of hyperbola-like functions
provide the best description for how each group discounts delayed rewards:
ζ(D) =
1
(1+ kD)s
, (11)
where D is the length of delay to a future reward (measured in years) and k and s are the parameters that
govern the rate of discounting and the scaling of amount and or delay. We take the hyperbolic discount
function estimated for each age group and find the best approximation to that function within the set
of quasi-hyperbolic discount functions that are parameterised by two parameters, δ and β. As we do all
throughout the paper, we follow Laibson et al. (2007) and set δ = 0.96.
To see howwe approximate β′s, let us focus on the young adult group in Read and Read (2004) as an
example. Read and Read (2004) estimate k = 0.076 and s = 0.516 for this age group. We first simulate
yearly discount factors as a function of years of delay implied by the hyperbolic discount function esti-
mated for this age group. Then, we set δ = 0.96 choose β using a simple least squares procedure: that
is, we choose β to minimise the sum of the squares of errors between the yearly discount factors that are
implied by the hyperbolic discount function and the quasi-hyperbolic discount function. For the young
adult group in Read and Read (2004), this procedure gives us β = 0.525. We repeat this procedure for
each age group in each study. The table below summarises the approximation procedure.
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Table 1: Approximating β from Hyperbolic Discount Functions
Age group k s β
Young adults (RR) 0.076 0.516 0.525
Middle-aged (RR) 0.120 0.289 0.732
Young adults (GMO) 0.075 0.724 0.362
This table reports the approximation procedure of β′s from corresponding hyperbolic discount functions
for different age groups estimated in Green et al. (1999) (GMO) and Read and Read (2004) (RR).
C Partial Sophistication
In our baseline model, we assume that people are fully sophisticated, meaning all agents in the economy
forecast the self-control problems faced by future selves and descendants perfectly. In this section, we
analyse whether our results depend on this assumption. We do so by allowing people to be partially
sophisticated in the following way. At each age i ∈ {1, ..., I}, with probability (1− pii) ∈ [0, 1], agent i
believes that starting with next period onwards all the future selves and descendants have perfect self-
control, and hence, they all discount according to δ discount factor only. With the remaining probability,
pii, agent i knows the true economic environment. Thus, pii represents the awareness (sophistication) of
self i regarding the self-control problems. The vector, pi = (pi1,pi2, ..,piI), then represents the sophistica-
tion profile of an individual over the life cycle. The way we model partial sophistication does not follow
the seminal paper of O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), and is more in line with Eliaz and Spiegler (2006)
and Asheim (2007).1
We set the partial sophistication model up for the general setup where the economy starts from any
initial level of capital stock and prices change over time. We first define the parent’s problem under
partial sophistication in the general setup.
1We justify our way of modelling partial sophistication on the grounds of tractability. The added bonus of our
model of partial sophistication is that the structure is consistent with a learning approach to sophistication (e.g.,
Ali (2011)).
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Parent’s Problem under Partial Sophistication (along the Transition)
V (b, k; τ) = max
b0
u (R(k) (1− τI) b+ w(k) + TI − b0) +
+δ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu
(
R(ki+1) (1− τi) bi(...(b0)...) +w(k
i+1) + Ti − bi+1
)
+ δIV
(
bI(...(b0)...), k
I+1; τ
)]
s.t. for all b0
b1(b0, k
1; τ) = argmax
bˆ1
u
(
R(k1) (1− τ0) b0 + w(k
1) + T0 − bˆ1
)
+
+δβ1

 pi1
{
∑
I−1
i=1 δ
i−1u
(
R(ki+1) (1− τi) bi(...(bˆ1)...) + w(k
i+1) + Ti − bi+1(...(bˆ1)...)
)
+ δI−1V
(
bI(...(bˆ1)...), k
I+1; τ
)}
+ (1− pi1)W1
(
bˆ1, k
2; τ
)


s.t. for all b1
b2(b1, k
2; τ) = argmax
bˆ2
u
(
R(k2) (1− τ1) b1 + w(k
2) + T1 − bˆ2
)
+δβ2

 pi2
{
∑
I−1
i=2 δ
i−2u
(
R(ki+1) (1− τi) bi(...(bˆ2)...) + w(k
i+1) + Ti − bi+1(...(bˆ2)...)
)
+ δI−2V
(
bI(...(bˆ2)...), k
I+1; τ
)}
+ (1− pi2)W2
(
bˆ2, k
3; τ
)


s.t. for all b2
...
s.t. for all bI−2
bI−1(bI−2, k
I−1; τ) ∈ argmax
bˆI−1
u
(
R(kI−1) (1− τI−2) bI−2 +w(k
I−1) + TI−2 − bˆI−1
)
+ δβ I−1 (1− piI−1)WI−1
(
bˆI−1, k
I ; τ
)
+δβ I−1
[
piI−1
{
u
(
R(kI) (1− τI−1) bˆI−1 + w(k
I) + TI−1 − bI(...(bˆI−1)...)
)
+ δV
(
bI(...(bˆI−1)...), k
I+1; τ
)}]
(12)
s.t. for all bI−1
bI(bI−1, k
I ; τ) = argmax
bˆI
u
(
R (1− τI−1) bI−1 +wI−1 + TI−1 − bˆI
)
+ δβ I
[
piIV
(
bˆI , k
I+1; τ
)
+ (1− piI)WI
(
bˆI , k
I+1; τ
)]
(13)
where the functionsWi for i = 0, 1, .., I − 1 solve:
Wi (b, k; τ) = max
b′
u
(
R (1− τi) b+wi + Ti − b
′
)
+ δWi+1
(
b′, k′; τ
)
;
with
WI (b, k; τ) = max
b′
u
(
R (1− τI) b+ wI + TI − b
′
)
+ δW0
(
b′, k′; τ
)
.
To understand the nested nature of policies and the way we model partial sophistication better, let us
analyse the definition of policies in (12) and (13). First, constraint (13) describes how self I chooses bI .
The number piI ∈ [0, 1] represents the belief of self I about the presence of self-control problems. More
precisely, this is the belief of self I about the probability that next period when he becomes a parent he
will face an offspring with self-control problems, i.e. (β1, . . . , β I) 6= (1, . . . , 1), and the offspring will face
an offspring with self-control problems, and so on. Note that in reality this probability is one, meaning
in each generation people face self-control problems over their life cycle. If piI < 1, self I is partially
naive in the sense that he incorrectly attaches positive probability (1− piI) to the event that there will
never be self-control problems in the future, i.e. (β1, . . . , β I) = (1, . . . , 1). So, in our environment, piI
represents the level of sophistication of self I. We assume that all agents, including the parents, correctly
11
guess the level of sophistication of their future selves, (pii)i. In other terms, agents share the same higher-
order beliefs.2 Second, consider constraint (12) which defines how self I − 1 chooses bI−1. The number
piI−1 ∈ [0, 1] represents the degree of sophistication of self I − 1, meaning self I − 1 knows the truth that
his followers will have self-control problems with probability piI−1. In particular, with piI−1 probability
self I − 1 thinks self I chooses bI according to (13), and with the remaining probability he thinks self
I chooses bI without facing any self-control problems. We have just seen that the last constraint, (13),
enters the parent’s problem in at least two ways: first, in the definition of self I’s policy function and
then as a constraint in the definition of self I − 1’s policy function. These two different constraints are
represented by a single constraint, (13), because the parent and self I − 1′s sophisticated belief agree
about how self I will behave.3 Similarly, the constraint describing self I − 1’s policy is also a constraint
in the constraint that describes self I− 2’s policy, and self I − 2’s policy is also a constraint of self I− 3’s,
and so on. Thus, actually the constraint that describes the policy of self i enters parent’s problem in i
different places but since these are all identical constraints, we represent them with just one constraint
that describes self i′s policy.
A Stationary Markov equilibrium with taxes τ consists of a level of capital k, prices R,w, value functions
V(·; τ) and {Wi(·; τ)}
I
i=0 and policy functions {bi(·; τ)}i such that: (i) the prices satisfy (2) in the main text; (ii)
the value functions and the policies are consistent with the parent’s problem described above; (iii) the government
budget is satisfied period-by-period and markets clear: Ti = Rτibi(k; τ) and bi(k; τ) = k for all i.
Proposition C.1. below proves that if the constant relative risk aversion coefficient σ is equal to 1,
meaning utility is logarithmic, then the degree of sophistication is immaterial for taxes.
Proposition C.1. Suppose u(c) = log(c). Then, for any level of partial sophistication over the life cycle, pi,
optimal taxes take the exact form of those in Proposition 1.
Proof. Relegated to Appendix C.1.
The invariance of optimal taxes to the level of sophistication for logarithmic utility is analogous
to the equivalence result obtained by Pollak (1968) on consumption policies in a partial equilibrium
environment. Proposition C.1. generalises this result to a general equilibrium environment where partial
sophistication is modelled differently from O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) which is the standard model
of partial sophistication in the literature.
It is evident from Proposition C.1. that in order to investigate the robustness of our policy findings
with respect to naivete´, we need tomove away from the assumption of σ = 1. Unfortunately, when σ 6= 1
and agents are allowed to be partially sophisticated, we do not get closed form solutions for optimal
2Of course, this structure is rich enough to allow for disagreements on higher order beliefs across agents as in
O’Donoghue and Rabin (2001). At the same time, if certain regularity conditions are satisfied, it is possible to map
such disagreements within a learning environment a` la Ali (2011) as either coming from different priors about each
other’s sophistication or from different information sets across agents. Details are available upon request.
3Sophisticated belief of self i about how self j, j > i, agrees with parent’s belief thanks to our assumption that
the same ‘beliefs’ (pii)i are shared by all agents.
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taxes. Therefore, we have to resort to numerical analysis. For simplicity, we keep the assumption that
the economy is at a steady state. The details of our computational procedure are explained in Appendix
C.2.
First, we set σ = 2 and analyse how different patterns of partial sophistication over the life cycle
affect optimal subsidies. Throughout this section, we set the life-cycle self-control pattern according to
our benchmark calibration, i.e. the first line of Table 1 in the main text. In Figure 1a, the blue solid curve
represents the benchmark case of full sophistication, pii = 1, for all i. Each dashed curve represents a
life-cycle patternwhere sophistication level starts at pi at the beginning of life and is constant until period
10 when it jumps to 1 and in period 11 it jumps back to pi. Then, there is a second jump in period 25, but
this is a permanent one: agent remains fully sophisticated from then on. We simulate optimal subsidies
for pi = 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9, and plot them in Figure 1a with dashed lines. The figure shows that the
level of optimal subsidies differ significantly from the benchmark case with full sophistication only in
periods which are followed by a sharp change in the level of sophistication in the subsequent period.
The dotted lines in Figure 1b plot optimal subsidieswhen the level of sophistication changes smoothly
over the life cycle for various values of σ.4 The solid blue line again represents the fully sophistication
benchmark (under any σ because the steady-state condition holds). This figure first of all confirms the
previous finding: the degree of sophistication does not matter for optimal subsidies as long as there are
no abrupt changes in sophistication. Figure 1b also suggests that, as σ moves away from 1, the effect of
sophistication becomes more significant. However, even when σ = 5, the difference between optimal
subsidies under full sophistication (the blue line) and the partially sophisticated model is around 0.05%
for the first period and this difference decreases to below 0.01% after the fourth period. Finally, in Figure
1b, the optimal subsidies under partial sophistication for σ = 0.5 are depicted by the dotted line that lies
below the full sophistication line whereas the subsidies for all σ > 1 are depicted by the dotted lines that
lie above it. This observation suggest a qualitative pattern: that for σ > 1(< 1), optimal taxes increase
(decrease) with the level of sophistication.5
We conclude that, as long as the level of naivete´ is not changing abruptly from one period to another,
the level optimal capital subsidies over the life cycle is robust to various scenarios about how sophis-
tication changes with age. Moreover, when the level of partial sophistication is changing smoothly (or
constant), the level optimal capital subsidies over the life cycle is not significantly affected by our choice
of the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion.
4To be precise, sophistication depends on age according to the concave function pi(i) = [1− 3(1+I−i)4I ]
1/2.
5An earlier related result is given in O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) which shows that, when we model partial
sophistication a la O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999), if σ > 1(< 1), thenmore sophisticated people over-consume less
(more). O’Donoghue and Rabin (2003) does not analyze taxes but the tax implication of their finding is obvious: if
σ > 1(< 1), then more sophisticated people should be taxed more (less) heavily. We have shown that this result is
valid under our way of modelling partial sophistication as well. The derivations are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Partial Sophistication
C.1 Proof of Proposition C.1.
The proof follows closely the proof of Proposition 1. Letting bi and k
i+1 be the saving level in period i
and aggregate capital stock in period i+ 1, define Γi(bi, k
i+1) and Gi(k
i+1) as in the proof of Proposition
1. Similarly, define ci+1(bi, k
i+1) = Mi+1Γi(bi, k
i+1).
Now using linearity of the policy functions and the first-order approach, we can rewrite the parent’s
problem as:
V (b, k; τ) = max
M0
u (M0ΓI (b)) + δ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δiu (Qi(k)Mi+1ΓI (b)) + δ
IV
(
(1−MI)QI−1(k)ΓI (b) , k
I+1; τ
)]
(14)
s.t. for all i ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}
(MiQi−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−σ= δβi

 piiR(ki+1)(1− τi(ki+1))

 ∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1)
(
MjQj−1(k)ΓI (b, k)
)−σ
Mj
Q j−1(k)
Qi(k)
+δI−iV ′(bI(..(b)..), k
I+1; τ)(1−MI)
QI−1(k)
Qi(k)


+ (1− pii)W
′
i
(
bi(..(b)..), k
i+1; τ
)


(MIQI−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−σ = δβ I
[
piIV
′
(
bI(..(b)..), k
I+1; τ
)
+ (1− piI)W
′
I
(
bI(..(b)..), k
I+1; τ
)]
.
Core proof of Proposition C.1.
Wewill prove that facing the sequence of efficient capital levels and the taxes specified in Proposition
1, people will choose the efficient allocation, thereby verifying both (1) that the sequence of the efficient
capital levels is actually part of equilibrium under the taxes described in Proposition 1, and (2) that under
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the taxes specified by Proposition 1, people choose the efficient allocation.
Guess
V (b, k; τ) = D log(ΓI (b, k)) + B(k),
Wi(b, k; τ) = Di log(Γi (b, k)) + Bi(k), for i = 0, .., I
where D and D0,D1, ..,DI , B0, ..., BI are constants of the parent’s and naive self-i’s value functions.
STEP 1: Compute the coefficients for the naive value functions, D0, ..,DI .
If we let k′ = K(k), from the first-order condition for theWi problem, we have (after tedious calcula-
tions):
bi (b, k; τ) =
R(k)(1− τi(k))b+ w(k) + Ti(k)− [Gi+1(k
′) +w(k′) + Ti+1(k
′)] [δR(k′)(1− τi+1(k
′))Di+1]
−1
1+ [δR(k′)(1− τi+1(k′))Di+1]
−1 R(k′)(1− τi+1(k′))
.
Plugging this in the value function, and performing some tedious re-arrangements, we get for i =
0, 1, .., I:
Di = (1+ δDi+1)
and
DI = (1+ δD0) .
Thus,
D0 = D1 = .. = DI =
1
1− δ
.
STEP 2: Compute the coefficients for parent’s value function, D.
Take D1, ..,DI from above. Compute V
′ and W ′i for i = 0, 1, .., I in terms of D,Di using the guesses
for value functions:
V ′(bI(..(b)..), k
I+1; τ) = DR(kI+1)(1− τI(k
I+1))(ΓI(b, k)QI(k))
−1, (15)
W ′i (bi(..(b)..), k
i+1; τ) = DiR(k
i+1)(1− τi(k
i+1))(ΓI(b, k)Qi(k))
−1,
where we used the recursion (1).
Plugging these in the constraints described in problem (14), we get for all i ∈ {1, ..., I − 1}:
(MiQi−1(k))
−1 = δβiR(k
i+1)(1− τi(k
i+1)) (Qi(k))
−1
[
pii
{
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
}
+ (1− pii)Di
]
and
(MIQI−1(k))
−1 = δβ IR(1− τI(k
I+1)) (QI(k))
−1 [piID+ (1− piI)DI ] .
Now, using the marginal condition describing self-I behaviour, it is easy to show that
MI(D) =
1
1+ β Iδ(piID+ (1− piI)DI)
.
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Similarly, use other constraints defining the policies to compute Mi(D) for i = 1, .., I − 1 :
Mi(D) =
1
1+ βiδ
(
pii
{
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
}
+ (1− pii)Di
) .
Taking first-order condition with respect to bequests in the parent’s problem (14) and plugging in
the Mi(D) from above, we get:
M0(D) =
1
1+ δ
(
∑
I−1
j=0 δ
j + δID
) .
Now verify the value function to compute D :
D log (ΓI (b, k)) + B(k) = log (M0(D)ΓI (b, k))
+δ
[
I−1
∑
i=0
δi log (Qi(k)Mi+1(D)ΓI (b, k)) + δ
I
{
D log (ΓI (b, k)QI(k)) + B(k
I+1)
}]
,
which implies
D =
I
∑
i=0
δi + δI+1D
and hence
D =
1
1− δ
.
By plugging D in the formula for Mi(D), we compute
Mi =
1− δ
1− δ + βiδ
, for all i ∈ {1, .., I}, (16)
M0 = 1− δ.
Now we turn to taxes that implement the efficient allocation. The constraint that describes self-i’s be-
haviour for i ∈ {1, .., I− 1} becomes the following once we plug in the derivatives of the value functions
from (15) :
(MiQi−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δβiR(k
i+1)(1− τi(k
i+1)) (Mi+1Qi(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1
[
pii
{
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
}
+ (1− pii)Di
]
Mi+1.
(17)
The comparison of (17) with the efficiency condition (1) in the main paper gives the optimal tax as:
(
1− τ∗i (k
i+1)
)
=
1
βi
([
pii
{
∑
I
j=i+1 δ
j−(i+1) + δI−iD
}
+ (1− pii)Di
]
Mi+1
)−1
=
1
βi
(1− δ + βi+1δ) ,
where from the first to the second equality we used (16). For self-I, the constraint describing his be-
haviour in problem (14) reads as follows:
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(MIQI−1(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δβ IR(k
I+1)(1− τI(k
I+1)) (M0QI(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1 [piID+ (1− piI)DI ]M0,
and the comparison of this with the efficiency condition gives
(
1− τ∗I (k
I+1)
)
=
1
β I
.
Finally, a comparison of the following first-order condition of the parent
(M0ΓI (b, k))
−1 = δR(k1)(1− τ0(k
1))(M1Q0(k)ΓI (b, k))
−1
[
∑
I−1
i=0 δ
i + δID
]
M−11
with the corresponding optimality condition gives
1− τ∗0 (k
1) = (1− δ + β1δ) .
C.2 Computational Procedure
C.2.1 Guess:
Guess6
V (b; τ) = D(τ)
(ΓI (b))
1−σ
1− σ
,
Wi(b; τ) = Di(τ)
(Γi (b))
1−σ
1− σ
,
where D and Di for i = 0, 1, .., I are constants of the parent’s and naive self-i’s value functions. Ob-
serve that these constants depend on the tax system, τ. In what follows, for notational simplicity this
dependence will be implicit.
C.2.2 Characterising equilibrium value function constants for a given tax system τ:
STEP 1: Computing equilibrium D0, ..,DI .
From the first-order conditions for theWi problem, we have: for all i ∈ {0, 1, .., I − 1}
Di =
[
[δR(1− τi+1)Di+1]
− 1σ R(1− τi+1)
1+ [δR(1− τi+1)Di+1]
− 1σ R(1− τi+1)
]1−σ (
1+ δ
Di+1
[δR(1− τi+1)Di+1]
− 1−σσ
)
, (18)
DI =
[
[δR(1− τ0)D0]
− 1σ R(1− τ0)
1+ [δR(1− τ0)D0]
− 1σ R(1− τ0)
]1−σ (
1+ δ
D0
[δR(1− τ0)D0]
− 1−σσ
)
.
Given taxes, the solution to these I + 1 equations give us I + 1 unknowns, D0, ..,DI.
6The matlab files used for all our simulations are available online. We refer to the README.pdf file for details.
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STEP 2: Computing equilibrium D.
From our guess of the value function, we have
V ′ (bI ; τ) = D(ΓI (bI))
−σR(1− τI),
and by envelope we have
V ′ (bI ; τ) = R(1− τI)u
′ (c0) = R(1− τI) (M0ΓI (bI))
−σ ,
which together imply
D = M−σ0 . (19)
C.2.3 Characterising optimal tax system, τ∗:
The incentive constraints for agents i = 1, ..I together with parent’s optimality condition with respect to
bequest decision characterise the solution to the parent’s problem and hence the equilibrium for a given
tax system, τ. Comparison of these I+ 1 equations with the corresponding commitment Euler equations,
we immediately see that optimal taxes must satisfy:
For all i ∈ {0, .., I − 2}, (20)
(
1− τ∗i+1
)
=
1
βi+1


[
pii+1
{
∑
I
j=i+2 δ
i−(i+2)
(
M∗j
Q∗j−1
Q∗i+1
)1−σ
+ δI−(i+1)D∗
(
Q∗I
Q∗i+1
)1−σ
+ (1− pii+1)D
∗
i+1
}]
M∗−σi+2


−1
(1− τ∗I ) =
1
β I
(
[piID
∗ + (1− piI)D
∗
I ]
M∗−σ0
)−1
(1− τ∗0 ) =


[
∑
I
i=1 δ
i−1
(
Mi
Q∗i−1
Q∗0
)1−σ
+ δID∗
(
Q∗I
Q∗0
)1−σ]
M∗−σ1


−1
,
where D∗ and D∗i are the values associated with the efficient allocation computed according to (19) and
(18) evaluated at the optimal taxes.
C.2.4 Iteration
1. Before starting the iteration, compute efficient consumption and saving allocations (c∗i , b
∗
i )
I
i=0 ac-
cording to:
c∗0 = Rb
(RI+1 − 1)
RI+1
1
∑
I
i=0
(
(Rδ)
1
σ
R
)i ,
for all i ∈ {0, .., I − 1}, c∗i+1 = c
∗
i (Rδ)
1
σ ,
b∗0 = Rb− c
∗
0,
for all i ∈ {0, .., I − 1}, b∗i+1 = Rb
∗
i − c
∗
i+1.
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2. Start with a guess for the efficient tax system τ = (τ0, .., τI), where is given by government’s period
budget constraint Ti = Rb
∗
i τi (for the initial guess we use optimal taxes in the logarithmic case).
3. Compute the linear policy functions according to formulas:
M0 =
c∗0
Rb(1− τI) + TI + GI
=
c∗0
Rb+ GI
,
For all i ∈ {0, 1, .., I − 1}, Mi+1 =
c∗i+1
Rb∗i (1− τi) + Ti + Gi
=
c∗i+1
Rb∗i + Gi
,
where
GI =
1
1−
[
RI+1 ∏Ij=0(1− τj)
]−1 I∑
i=0
Ti + w
Ri+1 ∏ij=0(1− τj)
and for all i ∈ {0, .., I − 1}
Gi =
Gi+1 + Rb
∗
i+1τi+1 +w
R(1− τi+1)
.
4. Compute D and D1, ..DI according to (19) and (18) evaluated at the tax guess.
5. Now use the linear policies computed in step 3 and the value function constants computed in step
4 to compute taxes according to the system of equations describing optimal taxes (20).
6. If the taxes you compute in step 5 is the same as the taxes you started the last iteration, stop. If not,
use the taxes you computed in step 5 as the new guess and continue iteration.
D Introducing an Illiquid Asset
To simplify our analysis, consider a three period version of our model. With one difference: there is an
additional asset people can buy in period one. Also, again for simplicity, we assume β1 = 0. This asset,
denoted by d1, is illiquid in the sense that it does not pay in period two, but pays in period 3 an after tax
return Rd(1− τd)d1. Self 2’s problem then is:
c2, c3 ∈ argmax
c2,c3
u(c2) + β¯2δu(c3)
s.t.
c2 +
c3
R(1− τ2)
≤ R(1− τ1)b1 + T1 +
T2
R(1− τ2)
+
Rd(1− τd)d1
R(1− τ2)
≡ y1(b1, d1)
Let c2(y1), c3(y1) be the solution to the above problem when β¯2 = β2 and cˆ2(y1), cˆ3(y1) when β¯2 = 1.
Self 1’s problem:
max
b1,d1
u(k0 − b1 − d1) + pi1δ [u(c2(y1)) + δu(c3(y1))]
+(1− pi1)δ [u(cˆ2(y1)) + δu(cˆ3(y1))] .
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Case 1. Government sets taxes such that
Rd(1− τd) < R2(1− τ1)(1− τ2).
In this case, obviously d1 = 0. So, it is as if there are no illiquid assets; government prevents people from
using these assets through taxes. Then, simply by setting τ1, τ2 exactly equal to the efficient taxes in the
environment without illiquid asset, τ∗1 , τ
∗
2 , we implement the efficient allocation in the market with the
illiquid asset. Let us compute these taxes for future use. Since
u′(c2) = β2δR(1− τ2)u
′(c3),
efficiency requires
(1− τ∗2 ) =
1
β2
.
To compute optimal period one tax, take first-order condition of the parent’s problem with respect to b1 :
u′(c1) = δ

 pi1
[
u′(c2(y1))c
′
2(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂b1
+ δu′(c3(y1))c
′
3(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂b1
]
+(1− pi1)
[
u′(cˆ2(y1))cˆ
′
2(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂b1
+ δu′(cˆ3(y1))cˆ
′
3(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂b1
]


where
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂b1
= R(1− τ1) (For ease of exposition, assume the policies are differentiable).
7 Therefore,
u′(c1) = δR(1− τ1)
(
pi1 [u
′(c2(y1))c
′
2(y1) + δu
′(c3(y1))c
′
3(y1)]
+(1− pi1)
[
u′(cˆ2(y1))cˆ
′
2(y1) + δu
′(cˆ3(y1))cˆ
′
3(y1)
] )
which implies:
(1− τ∗1 ) =
u′(c∗1)
δR
(
pi1
[
u′(c∗2)c
′
2(y
∗
1) + δu
′(c∗3)c
′
3(y
∗
1)
]
+ (1− pi1)
[
u′(cˆ∗2)cˆ
′
2(y
∗
1) + δu
′(cˆ∗3)cˆ
′
3(y
∗
1)
]) ,
where y∗1 is the net present value of wealth under the efficient allocation.
Case 2. Government sets taxes such that
Rd(1− τd) ≥ R2(1− τ1)(1− τ2).
Then, obviously, agents might be using d1 ≥ 0. In that case, since
u′(c2) = β2δR(1− τ2)u
′(c3)
still holds, efficiency still requires
(1− τ∗2 ) =
1
β2
.
7It is well-known that in general we cannot guarantee even the continuity of the policy functions (e.g., see
Krusell and Smith (2003), and Harris and Laibson (2001)).
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To see optimal taxes on the illiquid asset, consider the first-order condition with respect to d1 :
u′(c1) = δ

 pi1
[
u′(c2(y1))c
′
2(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂d1
+ δu′(c3(y1))c
′
3(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂d1
]
+(1− pi1)
[
u′(cˆ2(y1))cˆ
′
2(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂d1
+ δu′(cˆ3(y1))cˆ
′
3(y1)
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂d1
]


where
∂y1(b1,d1)
∂d1
= R
d(1−τd)
R(1−τ2)
. Therefore,
u′(c1) = δ
Rd(1− τd)
R(1− τ2)
(
pi1 [u
′(c2(y1))c
′
2(y1) + δu
′(c3(y1))c
′
3(y1)]
+(1− pi1)
[
u′(cˆ2(y1))cˆ
′
2(y1) + δu
′(cˆ3(y1))cˆ
′
3(y1)
] )
which implies:
Rd(1− τd∗) =
= R(1− τ∗2 )
u′(c∗1)
δR
(
pi1
[
u′(c∗2)c
′
2(y
∗
1) + δu
′(c∗3)c
′
3(y
∗
1)
]
+ (1− pi1)
[
u′(cˆ∗2)cˆ
′
2(y
∗
1) + δu
′(cˆ∗3)cˆ
′
3(y
∗
1)
])
= R(1− τ∗2 )R(1− τ
∗
1 ). (21)
As a result, when there is an illiquid asset, government can either prevent people from using this asset
by taxing it heavily or has to tax it according to (21). In either case, the taxes on period one and period
two liquid assets are exactly equal to the optimal taxes in the environment without illiquid assets.
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